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JUDICIAL FEDERALISM IN ACTION: COORDINATION




Stories are an old way of organizing knowledge, but their place in the
world has been less visible since the rise of scientific philosophy during
the Enlightenment Theories about.., the way gases respond to heat
and pressure were provable, always correct, and often simple. Even
outside the sciences, the paradigm for truth was that it should be law-
like, preferably reduced to the form of a solvable equation. However,
since complexity has emerged as a driving force in the way the world
works, the dominant belief in a deterministic and reliably quantifiable
truth has begun to yield. There are now many ways of knowing. Our
need for realism and proof is as strong, but we can find and express
that in this different way. If the planners of Three Mile Island had
written a story about how things could go wrong, instead of a numeric
analysis of possible fault sequences, they would have been better pre-




rPstOUGH legal scholarship does not traditionally come in the form of
stories, much can be learned from them.2 This Article tells the stories of
how several state and federal judges forged into uncharted territory to coor-
* Director, Federal Judicial Center; Senior United States District Judge, Northern District
of California.
** Associate, Williams & Connolly, Washington, D.C. Law clerk to Judge William W
Schwarzer, 1991-92.
*** Senior Attorney/Writer, Federal Judicial Center.
The authors thank the many judges and attorneys who consented to be interviewed and gave
generously of their time. The transcripts of these interviews, as well as any reports and other
communications cited without specific reference, are on fie at the Federal Judicial Center in
Washington, D.C.
I Peter Schwartz, The Art of the Long View 40-41 (1991).
2 See Kim L. Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2073, 2073 (1989)
(considering the rise of stories as "an important and recurring theme in legal scholarship").
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dinate complex litigation pending in their courts. These stories offer a cornu-
copia of ideas and lessons for both judges and lawyers. Because each
incident of litigation is sui generis, however, awareness of what has been
done is only a start. We hope these stories will stimulate creative thinking,
and encourage a willingness to be innovative and bold that can be applied in
smaller multiforum litigation as well as in "monster" cases.
The proliferation of closely related cases spanning multiple forums, both
state and federal, has created serious problems for the civil litigation process
and confronted the judiciary with a management crisis.3 This type of litiga-
tion occurs when numerous claims arise from a single event, such as a fire or
plane crash, or from a common course of conduct or set of circumstances,
such as widespread use of a dangerous product or exposure to a toxic sub-
stance. When companion cases proceed separately in state and federal
courts, duplication and a consequent drain on judicial and private resources
result. This, in turn, frustrates the oft-stated goal of the judiciary: "the just,
speedy, and inexpensive" resolution of every action.'
Within both the state and federal systems, the procedures available for
aggregating or consolidating5 claims are limited, but procedures for intersys-
tem aggregation 6 are even more limited. Although several proposals
designed to facilitate intersystem aggregation have been advanced, insuffi-
cient attention has been given to the extensive coordination between state
and federal courts that can be achieved without new legislation or rules, and
without subordinating one system to the other. In a number of cases, state
and federal judges have engaged in informal arrangements to coordinate
related litigation. Their cooperation has involved calendar coordination,
coordinated discovery, joint settlement efforts, and joint motions hearings
and rulings. Some judges have even contemplated joint state-federal trials.
In this Article, we examine several cases in which judges have gone
beyond existing formal mechanisms to coordinate litigation in state and fed-
eral courts. We describe the various arrangements the judges used to
address the problems presented by related multiforum litigation and con-
sider the circumstances under which coordination is likely to be successful.
Finally, we address some federalism7 concerns that may arise when state and
federal judges coordinate litigation.
3 See infra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
4 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 ("These rules... shall be construed to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action.").
5 "Aggregation" refers to cases being brought onto the same docket, whereas
"consolidation" refers to cases being jointly tried or managed.
6 "Intersystem aggregation" refers to the aggregation of state and federal cases.
7 We use the term "federalism" broadly to refer to state and federal interests and the
interaction between the two.
1690 [Vol. 78:1689
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Part I discusses the negative consequences of related multiforum litiga-
tion, and briefly outlines existing formal mechanisms for aggregating cases
concurrently pending in both state and federal courts. Part II discusses sev-
eral proposed new mechanisms for facilitating aggregation. Part III tells the
stories of judges who engaged in informal intersystem coordination, includ-
ing the different ways they went about coordinating their litigation, the tech-
niques they developed, the procedures that proved most successful, and how
difficulties encountered in the process were or were not resolved. Finally,
Part IV addresses various issues relevant to state-federal coordination,
including the factors that make a particular litigation suitable for coordina-
tion, the role of attorneys in facilitating coordination, and a variety of feder-
alism concerns-such as deference by state and federal judges to one another
on questions of state and federal law, and the tension between consistency
and correctness.
We conclude that when litigation spans state and federal courts, informal
coordination can advance judicial economy, efficiency, and fairness. This
Article seeks to promote such coordination in a manner consistent with the
interests of the judiciary, the litigants, and the public.
I. RELATED MULTIFORUM LITIGATION
Most related multiforum litigation results from mass torts: situations in
which numerous injuries and, therefore, numerous lawsuits result from the
same event or set of circumstances. Because these claims are usually based
on state law, many of them are filed in state court, although those cases
involving parties of wholly diverse citizenship may be fied in or removed to
federal court. Even when the allegedly tortious conduct is governed by a
federal statute, cases often end up in both judicial systems because federal
and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over most federal law claims.'
8 See Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1876). Although torts are the paradigm,
they are not the only type of claim giving rise to multiforum litigation. Various statutory
violations or breach of warranty actions may also trigger litigation in multiple forums.
1992] 1691
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Related multiforum litigation generates duplicative proceedings9 that pro-
duce great expense'0 and delay," and thus frustrate plaintiffs' recovery of
compensation.'" Court dockets become even more crowded, thereby affect-
ing all litigants in the civil justice system."3 In addition, different courts can
9 For example, depositions of witnesses, pertaining to identical matters, are taken by
multiple plaintiffs. See, e.g., In re Motion Picture Licensing Antitrust Litig., 468 F. Supp. 837,
841-42 (J.P.M.L. 1979) (consolidating cases in part "to prevent duplicative discovery").
Similarly, identical or similar motions are filed in countless courts, and the same issues are
repeatedly adjudicated. See Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking
Plaintiff Autonomy and the Court's Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
809, 811 (1989) ("Relitigation of identical issues wastes scarce judicial resources in both
federal and state courts."); John C. McCoid, A Single Package for Multiparty Disputes, 28
Stan. L. Rev. 707, 707 (1976) ("[R]epeated examination of the issues raised by a single
transaction is a waste."); David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual
Justice by Collective Means, 62 Ind. L.J. 561, 563 (1987) (mass torts require "courts to
reinvent the wheel for each claim").
10 Both litigants and the courts incur high expenses from mass torts. See Mark A. Peterson
& Molly Selvin, Institute for Civil Justice, Resolution of Mass Torts: Toward a Framework for
Evaluation of Aggregative Procedures 8-9 (1988) ("The total amount of money involved in
mass tort litigation can be staggering, even when public costs are ignored.... Mass tort
litigation also imposes an enormous burden on the court system .... "); Robert H. Sand, How
Much is Enough? Observations in Light of the Agent Orange Settlement, 9 Harv. Envtl. L.
Rev. 283, 297-98 (1985) (estimating that in the Agent Orange litigation a set of depositions
pertaining to a single defense cost $13,440,000); Spencer Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions:
Going, Going, Gone? 98 F.R.D. 323, 324 (1983) (predicting that mass tort cases could
conceivably "bankrupt both the state and federal court systems").
11 The expense and delay in mass tort litigation result from the large numbers of documents
and witnesses, the difficulty of coordinating the schedules of multiple parties and attorneys,
and the complexity of issues, all of which occasion prolonged discovery and investigation,
extensive motions, and lengthy trials. See Report of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc
Committee on Asbestos Litigation 10-14 (1991) (discussing causes of delays in and high costs
of asbestos litigation); Martin I. Kaminsky, Proposed Federal Discovery Rules for Complex
Civil Litigation, 48 Fordham L. Rev. 907, 909 n.11 (1980). Asbestos cases, for example,
average 30 months from filing to disposition, almost double the target set by the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990. See Report of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos
Litigation, supra, at 10-11.
12 High transaction costs, such as attorneys' and witness' fees, greatly reduce the actual
compensation received by prevailing plaintiffs. See James S. Kakalik, Patricia A. Ebener,
William L.F. Felstiner & Michael G. Shanley, Institute for Civil Justice, Costs of Asbestos
Litigation at viii, 40 (1983) (noting that the average asbestos plaintiff receives an amount equal
to 37% of total trial expenses); Roger H. Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort
Litigation, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 779, 781 n.8 (1985); Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of the Court in
Toxic Tort Litigation, 73 Geo. L.J. 1389, 1389 (1985) ("[IThe cost of delivering compensation
through the courts is too high when the cost of the transaction and the amount received by the
person seeking compensation are compared.").
13 See Report of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation, supra
note 11, at 12 ("The parties in asbestos cases are not the only parties affected .... Districts
with heavy asbestos caseloads necessarily experience increased delays in other civil matters.");
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reach divergent decisions on nearly identical factual and legal issues, produc-
ing unfairness and uncertainty.14 Moreover, the sheer number of claims can
render defendants insolvent and consequently prevent future plaintiffs from
receiving any compensation. These phenomena, in turn, increase public dis-
satisfaction with the justice system and the legal profession. 5
Such consequences have sparked a search for effective means of aggregat-
ing cases that arise from common causes. 16 Federal courts are now able to
aggregate or consolidate federal cases to some extent. 17 Because state courts
comprise fifty independent judiciaries, however, less can be done to aggre-
Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 564 (mass torts "consume[] vast quantities of public resources,
raising the price of access for other... types of tort claims").
14 See Peterson & Selvin, supra note 10:
[O]utcomes will be inconsistent. With multiple trials some plaintiffs will receive
nothing, whereas others will receive exceptionally large awards for essentially similar
claims. Defendants and observers will have little guidance about future conduct
because they receive inconsistent signals about the propriety of their actions. Differing
state laws (e.g., statutes of limitations, availability of punitive damages) contribute to
this inconsistency.
Id. at 12 (footnote omitted); see also Jack B. Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections on the Law's
Reaction to Disasters, 11 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1, 16 (1986) ("It is essential that there be a single,
easily determined and authoritative substantive law applied to the litigation so that the parties
know in advance what the law provides.").
Is See Dreis & Krump Mfg. v. International Ass'n of Machinists Dist. No. 8, 802 F.2d 247,
255 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting "growing public dissatisfaction with the costs and delays of
litigation"); Stephen D. Sugarman, Taking Advantage of the Torts Crisis, 48 Ohio St. L.J.
329, 337 (1987) (noting that some mass tort litigation has "helped to reinforce the stereotypical
negative view of lawyers," and concluding that it is "potentially quite a bad thing for the
public at large to hold both lawyers and the law in low esteem").
16 See Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," 54 Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer
1991, at 5, 55 ("The perceived utility of centralization is overwhelming the few voices that
argue for the desirability of continuing to have multiple and overlapping cases and court
systems.").
17 All related cases in a single jurisdiction may be assigned to the same judge. Further, Rule
42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the consolidation of actions pending
in one judicial district, and 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) empowers district courts to transfer a case to
any district in which it could have been brought.
Most significantly, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 authorizes the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation ("JPML") to transfer related civil actions pending in different courts to any district
for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Under § 1407, transferee courts may
oversee settlement and summary judgment procedures. Further, pursuant to § 1404(a),
transferee judges can retain many of the lawsuits for trial. See, e.g., In re Fine Paper Antitrust
Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 818-20 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1156 (1983); see also George
T. Conway III, Note, The Consolidation of Multistate Litigation in State Courts, 96 Yale L.J.
1099, 1102 n.23 (1987) (noting that "[c]ourts have consistently held that a § 1407 transferee
court may transfer multidistrict litigation to itself for trial under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)"). Thus,
although the applicability of the statute is limited to pretrial proceedings, it has led to the
aggregated resolution of numerous claims. See Patricia D. Howard, A Guide to Multidistrict
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gate cases dispersed throughout the state systems.18 Moreover, only limited
procedures are available for transfer of cases from state to federal court.19
Defendants may "remove" certain cases from state court to federal court,20
and federal courts can exercise "supplemental jurisdiction" over various
Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 577, 578 (1978) (noting "the great success of the transferee judges in
terminating [actions] by settlement, summary judgment, or other type of dismissal").
The potential of § 1407 as a consolidation device is illustrated by the JPML's recent decision
to consolidate over 26,000 asbestos cases in the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L. 1991).
The transfer mechanisms are limited, however. As noted, § 1407 is limited to pretrial
proceedings. Section 1404(a) enables the transferee court to retain some consolidated cases for
trial, but only those that could have been brought there initially. See Elinor P. Schroeder,
Relitigation of Common Issues: The Failure of Nonparty Preclusion and an Alternative
Proposal, 67 Iowa L. Rev. 917, 917 n.2 (1982) (observing that "28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976),
allows a federal court to transfer an action to another federal court 'for the convenience of
parties and witnesses' and 'in the interest of justice,' but the transferee court must be one in
which venue and jurisdiction would have been proper originally.").
18 There is no interstate transfer and consolidation tool akin to 28 U.S.C. § 1407. Some
commentators have proposed that states adopt such a device. See, e.g., Schroeder, supra note
17, at 965. The National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws recently
recommended that all states enact a Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act-providing for
interstate transfers of both pretrial actions and trials-initiated by the transferor court but
requiring acceptance by the transferee court. Unif. Transfer of Litig. Act, 14 U.L.A. 78 (Supp.
1992); see also American Law Inst., Complex Litigation Project (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1992)
(addressing, in part, "the problem of transfer of litigation from one state to another").
There are valuable aggregation devices available within some states. Many states have rules
similar to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a) authorizing consolidation of related actions. See, e.g., Cal. Civ.
Proc. Code §§ 404.-404.8 (West 1973 & Supp. 1992); Iowa R. Civ. P. 185; Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 60-242 (1983); Mich. Ct. R. 2.505; Minn. R. Civ. P. 42.01; Mo. R. Civ. P. 66.01(b); Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 805.05(1) (West 1977 & Supp. 1990). A few state courts have implicitly
recognized an inherent judicial power to consolidate certain cases. See, e.g., Means v.
Montana Power Co., 625 P.2d 32, 36 (Mont. 1981) (ruling that the trial court, "in exercising
its managerial power" over the case, did not abuse its discretion in "providing for the
appointment of a lead counsel" in consolidation of the case). See also Jack B. Weinstein &
Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort Law, 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 269
(suggesting that judges' equitable powers permit them to take measures not directly authorized
by formal rules).
19 Additionally, in "exceptional" circumstances a federal court may stay its proceedings out
of deference to pending state court proceedings. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist.
v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976) ("[T]he circumstances permitting the dismissal of a
federal suit due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial
administration are considerably more limited than the circumstances appropriate for
abstention. The former circumstances, though exceptional, do nevertheless exist."); Schomber
v. Jewel Cos., 614 F. Supp. 210, 218 (N.D. IlM. 1985) (staying federal proceedings where state
court had undertaken complex administrative procedures to oversee the action).
20 The general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988 & Supp. II 1990), enables
defendants, subject to limitations, to remove actions over which the federal courts have
original diversity or federal question jurisdiction.
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claims or cases.2 1 These devices are, however, applicable only in limited
circumstances22 and their use cannot be initiated by the court.
23
The class action, either federal24 or state,25 is a potentially more signifi-
cant means of intersystem consolidation. If, however, members of the certi-
fied class are permitted to "opt out," only limited consolidation will be
achieved. A mandatory class action (i.e., one where class members may not
opt out), by contrast, brings all related claims into a single case. Yet, federal
appellate courts have often rejected mandatory class actions in mass tort
litigation,26 especially where certification interferes with cases in the state
21 Supplemental jurisdiction is an umbrella term embracing pendent claims, pendent
parties, and ancillary jurisdiction, all of which involve a federal court entertaining a state claim
over which it has no independent subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. II
1990). When a plaintiff states both federal and state claims based on sufficiently similar facts,
the federal court may exercise "pendent jurisdiction" over the state claim. In some
circumstances, the court may exercise "pendent party jurisdiction" over a party in the absence
of an independent basis for jurisdiction, if the claim against the party is sufficiently related to
one made against a party over whose claim the court has federal question jurisdiction.
"Ancillary jurisdiction" is a kind of pendent party jurisdiction arising from counterclaims,
cross-claims, third-party claims, and intervenors' claims lacking an independent basis for
federal jurisdiction but intimately connected to a case properly before the court.
22 See American Law Inst., Report: Preliminary Study of Complex Litigation 62 (1987)
(noting that "[p]endent and ancillary jurisdiction may be helpful to a limited extent in
preventing parallel litigation in state and federal court, or in separate actions, of issues
common to more than one claim between the same parties," but that "this pattern of
dispersion is not a major component of the complex litigation problem"). Moreover, pendent
party jurisdiction is not permitted when the federal court's jurisdiction is based on diversity,
which is generally the case in mass torts. Id. at 61. Interpleader is another procedural device
that enables federal courts to hear consolidated state and federal claims, Fed. R. Civ. P. 22, but
it too applies only in rare circumstances.
23 Removal is at the discretion of defendants. See infra notes 31-42 and accompanying text
(discussing proposals to broaden removal). Likewise, although federal courts hear pendent
state claims, nothing prevents plaintiffs from bringing the claims in state court instead. An
intervenor, as well as a party, may invoke ancillary jurisdiction, but the court may not.
24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
25 Most states have enacted statutes authorizing class actions. See Note, Multistate Plaintiff
Class Actions: Jurisdiction and Certification, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 718, 718-19 & nn.6-9 (1979).
26 See In re Fireboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 1990) (vacating class because of
insufficient commonality); In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1180-83 (8th Cir.)
(vacating class certification order because its effect on state court actions violated the Anti-
Injunction Act), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982); see also Linda S. Mullenix, Beyond
Consolidation: Postaggregative Procedure in Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 32 Win. & Mary
L. Rev. 475, 482-83, 500-02 & nn.125-27 (1991) (noting federal courts' resistance to certifying
mass tort claims for class action, and citing relevant cases and literature).
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system.27 More importantly, mandatory class actions may be unavailable
when the trial court lacks personal jurisdiction over some of the parties.28
Bankruptcy proceedings offer another means of intersystem aggregation,
because filing of a petition in bankruptcy stays all federal and state court
actions involving the debtor,2 9 and permits centralization of claims against
it. This opportunity only arises, however, when a defendant (or its creditor)
files for bankruptcy-a relatively rare occurrence. Moreover, related mul-
tiforum litigation often involves several defendants, so bankruptcy proceed-
ings involving a single defendant will permit piecemeal litigation to continue
rather than lead to significant aggregation.30
The current means of achieving intersystem aggregation and consolidation
are clearly limited. A number of legislative proposals for enlarging the
power of courts to achieve intersystem aggregation and consolidation have
been advanced. We now turn to a brief review of these proposals.
27 See, e.g., In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1002 (3d Cir.) (vacating certification
of a mandatory class in part because it implicated "serious questions of personal jurisdiction
and intrusion into the autonomous operation of state judicial systems"), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
852, and cert. denied, 479 U.S. 915 (1986).
28 In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), the Supreme Court upheld an
opt-out class despite the fact that some plaintiffs lacked the minimum contacts with the forum
state usually required for personal jurisdiction. It reasoned that by not opting out, plaintiffs
consented to jurisdiction. The Court stated that "due process requires at a minimum that an
absent plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the class." Id. at 812.
On its face, this language seems to preclude mandatory class actions. See Arthur R. Miller &
David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions After Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 Yale L.J. 1, 39 (1986) (footnote omitted) ("[Tihe concept,
expressed in Shutts, that the right to opt out is a fundamental due process requirement seems
to contradict the mandatory class action that has developed under Federal Rule 23 and its
state counterparts."). Alternatively, Shutts may be seen as prohibiting mandatory classes
when any class members lack requisite contact with the forum state. See, e.g., Waldron v.
Raymark Indus., 124 F.R.D. 235, 238 (N.D. Ga. 1989). Some commentators claim that
mandatory classes remain possible even then, if "equity and efficiency factors [are] so
compelling as to overcome distant forum abuse concerns." Miller & Crump, supra, at 53. In
any case, Shutts severely limits mandatory class actions in both state and federal courts, with
its impact apparently greatest in the state courts. See generally American Law Inst., supra
note 22, at 42, 47-48, 101, 104, 158-59 (discussing the use of the class action as a mechanism
for processing complex litigation).
29 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 362 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). In the federal system, the district court
has the power to withdraw and consider some actions referred to the bankruptcy court. 28
U.S.C. § 157(d) (1988).
30 See generally Margaret I. Lyle, Note, Mass Tort Claims and the Corporate Tortfeasor:
Bankruptcy Reorganization and Legislative Compensation Versus the Common-Law Tort
System, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 1297, 1314-36 (1983) (discussing limitations and drawbacks of using
bankruptcy proceedings to handle mass tort claims).
1696
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II. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
Under the status quo, closely related cases often proceed independently in
state and federal courts. Several proposals seek to alter this state of affairs
by encouraging or requiring suits that currently end up in state court to be
brought in or removed to federal court.
31
Some proposals call for Congress, under its power to regulate interstate
commerce, to establish a federal tort law, at least for mass torts. Congress
could enact statutes defining federal torts,3 2 or it could authorize federal
courts to develop a federal common law of torts.33 Both approaches would
greatly increase federal court jurisdiction over such torts. Alternatively,
Congress might expand federal jurisdiction to include certain torts while
preserving the application of state substantive law.34 For example, the
American Bar Association Commission on Mass Torts recommended that
Congress grant the federal courts jurisdiction over litigation in which 250 or
more claims, each seeking more than $50,000 in damages, arise from either a
single accident or from the use of or exposure to a single substance or prod-
uct.35 In such cases, a federal judicial panel (created by the proposed stat-
ute) could declare the cases pending in state and federal court "mass tort
litigation" subject to consolidation. The panel could then transfer some or
all of the cases to a single federal court. A similar proposal would give fed-
eral courts jurisdiction over mass torts in cases of minimal diversity (i.e.,
when any plaintiff and any defendant are from different states, as opposed to
the current requirement of complete diversity).3 6 This would enable more
plaintiffs to file in federal court and more defendants to remove to federal
court.
31 Some commentators would also authorize "reverse removal," whereby the JPML or a
similarly constituted body could transfer cases from the federal courts to the state courts. See
American Law Inst., supra note 18, at 15; Conway, supra note 17, at 1107-08.
32 See, e.g., Alvin B. Rubin, Mass Torts and Litigation Disasters, 20 Ga. L. Rev. 429, 443-
45 (1986) (arguing for uniform federal substantive tort law).
33 See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed Federal
Procedure Act, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 1039, 1077-79 (1986) (arguing for the development of a federal
common law of torts).
34 Such statutes would arguably be authorized by the doctrine of "protective jurisdiction,"
under which Congress may give federal courts jurisdiction in areas in which it could enact
substantive laws. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 491 n.17 (1983)
(citing Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 933 (1982)) (declining
to address constitutionality of "protective jurisdiction").
35 American Bar Ass'n Comm'n on Mass Torts, Report to the House of Delegates (1989).
36 See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty,
Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 7, 10-11 (1986); Report of the Federal Courts
Study Committee 44-45 (1990). The Federal Courts Study Committee report, like several
proposals discussed infra, also recommended broadening 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) to permit
consolidation of trials as well as pretrial proceedings. Id. at 45.
1992] 1697
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Congress is currently considering a bill that would give federal courts
original and removal jurisdiction in cases that meet the following prerequi-
sites: the cause of action arises from a single accident or event; the parties are
minimally diverse; at least twenty-five persons have been killed or injured in
the accident at a discrete location; and each claimant alleges damages in
excess of $50,000."7 Under the bill, if the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation ("JPML") transferred all the federal cases to a single court for
consolidated pretrial proceedings, the transferee court could retain all the
cases for trial as well. Because, however, the bill would apply only to "single
accident[s]," and not to successive exposure to products or substances, its
scope is fairly limited.
The American Law Institute ("ALI") is considering whether to advocate
a far-reaching statutory scheme38 that would replace the JPML with a
"Complex Litigation Panel" ("CLP") with greater power to transfer and
consolidate cases. The CLP would have the authority to transfer state as
well as federal cases, to consolidate cases for trial as well as pretrial proceed-
ings, and to transfer select issues as well as entire actions. The scheme's
primary means for facilitating intersystem aggregation involves elimination
of many existing limitations on case removal. Currently, only defendants
may remove cases, and the general removal statute applies only where the
requirements of federal question or diversity jurisdiction are met. 9 More-
over, current law permits removal only to the district court and division
within which such action is pending.' Whereas the JPML itself has no
removal power, the ALI scheme would authorize the CLP to remove cases
without any of the currently existing limitations. The scheme provides that
whenever a state case bears a transactional nexus to and shares a common
question of law or fact with an already-fied federal case, the CLP may order
its removal and consolidation with the federal case.41 There are no diversity
requirements, and either one of the parties42 or the presiding state court
judge may initiate removal.
37 The initial version of this legislation was introduced in 1989. The latest version, H.R.
2450, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), was introduced in May 1991 and passed by the House in
November 1991. Its prospects in the Senate are uncertain.
38 American Law Inst., Complex Litigation Project (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1990).
39 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1988).
40 Id. § 1441(a).
41 Under current law, consolidation of a state case with a federal case usually requires a
two-step process: removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 followed by a JPML transfer under 28
U.S.C. § 1407. The ALI's proposed statute would enable the CLP to consolidate directly a
state case with federal cases.
42 One may wonder why plaintiffs would ever want to remove cases they brought in state
court. The answer is that circumstances can arise that were not present when the case was
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Although scrutiny of these and other proposals43 is beyond the scope of
this Article,' it is important to recognize that none of these proposals, even
if adopted, would be a panacea. Most of them would redirect large numbers
of cases from the state courts into the already overburdened federal courts,
without advancing the cause of aggregation unless all of the cases were
brought into a single federal court. But if all of the cases ended up in one
court, that court could be paralyzed by the litigation.45
These legislative proposals, then, all have serious shortcomings. More-
over, Congress has not shown great interest in these formal mechanisms and
is not likely to enact any of them in the foreseeable future. But even within
the existing system, the judiciary, together with counsel, can take effective
action to reduce costs, delays, and inefficiencies. When related claims are
pending in state and federal courts, judges in the two systems can informally
coordinate their proceedings. This has already happened in several cases,
and an analysis of the results, undertaken in the following Part, is a critical
first step for assessing the potential and the limitations of such arrangements.
filed. For example, a federal case might be filed to which the state case might fruitfully be
joined.
43 In addition to the proposals discussed in the text, several other reforms have been
suggested. The ALI project explored the possibility of an Interstate Complex Litigation
Compact or, alternatively, an Interstate Complex Litigation Act, which would establish a
regime for the aggregation of complex litigation among the consenting states and, in the case of
a compact, the federal courts. See American Law Inst., supra note 38, at 131. Other possible
approaches are to expand the doctrine of "issue preclusion," see Schroeder, supra note 17, or
to set up an administrative claims system to compensate mass tort victims. See Francis E.
McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 659, 693-94 (1989);
Weinstein, supra note 14, at 33-36.
44 It should be noted that the ALI proposal makes removal discretionary with the CLP,
which is instructed to consider various federalism concerns, some of which will be discussed
infra. It also bears mentioning that the ALI's proposed statute ensures the availability of
supplemental jurisdiction so that the transferee court can hear additional cases and claims.
The proposed statute confers a transferee court with subject-matter jurisdiction over any claim
that "arises from the same transaction, occurrence, or series of related transactions or
occurrences" as the transferred claim, or "involves indemnification arising from the same
transaction" as the transferred claim. American Law Inst., supra note 38, § 5.03. Finally, it
should be noted that the ALI also favors measures enabling transfer from federal to state
courts and among state courts in different states. American Law Inst., supra note 18, at 15,
§ 4.01.
45 Many of the proposals also encounter constitutional objections rooted in the
jurisdictional limitations of Article III. See Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Litigation Reform
and Article III Jurisdiction, 59 Fordham L. Rev. 169 (1990).
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III. CASE STUDIES IN INFORMAL INTERSYSTEM COORDINATION
We have studied various cases in which state and federal judges coordi-
nated proceedings before them.4 6 In this Part, we draw on these case studies
to analyze what kinds of coordination at what stages of litigation are most
promising. To set the stage for that analysis, we offer a brief summary (in
chronological order) of each instance of litigation we have studied in
depth.47 Details of these and other cases will emerge in the following discus-
sion of the nature of coordination that has been achieved at each stage of
litigation.
A. Illustrative Cases
1 Florida Everglades Air Crash
On December 29, 1972, a jet aircraft flying from New York to Miami
crashed in the Florida Everglades, killing ninety-six passengers and injuring
many others. Lawsuits were filed in Florida state courts and in federal
courts in Florida and New York. Eventually, the JPML transferred all the
federal cases to the docket of Judge Peter T. Fay, then a District Judge for
the Southern District of Florida, for coordinated pretrial proceedings.48 The
Florida state cases were all assigned to Judge Harvie S. DuVal. Judges Fay
and DuVal coordinated discovery extensively. They considered a joint state-
federal trial on liability, but instead opted for the trial of two federal test
cases, with many of the state parties agreeing to be bound by the results.4 9
Ten days before trial, the parties settled on the liability issue.50 Disputes
over damages were tried or settled by the judges within their own jurisdic-
tions, without coordination.
46 We intentionally selected different kinds of cases-products liability, securities law,
accidents-to illustrate that the potential for state-federal coordination is not limited to a
narrow range of cases. We did not undertake a comprehensive study of cases and no statistical
conclusions should be drawn. But we believe the cases to be a generally representative sample.
For an earlier example of coordination, see Paul D. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An
Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 Cal. L. Rev. 116 (1968).
47 The case summaries and the analysis that follow are based on interviews with judges and
attorneys as well as on examination of the paper record. Wherever there is no citation to a
particular event, our source was the judge(s) involved in the case.
48 In re Air Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades on Dec. 29, 1972, 368 F. Supp. 812 (J.P.M.L.
1973).
49 See In re Aircrash Disaster at Fla. Everglades on Dec. 29, 1972, 549 F.2d 1006, 1009 (5th
Cir. 1977).
50 Id. at 1010.
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2. Beverly Hills Supper Club Fire
On May 28, 1977, a fire destroyed a nightclub in Kentucky, killing or
injuring over 300 persons. Numerous lawsuits were filed in both the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky and in Kentucky
state court. Because of a backlog in the Eastern District of Kentucky, Judge
Carl B. Rubin of the Southern District of Ohio volunteered to hear the fed-
eral cases. He was designated to sit in the Eastern District of Kentucky and
was assigned the cases. The state cases were before Judge John A. Diskin.
The two judges coordinated all scheduling and pretrial activity. Judges
Rubin and Diskin eventually divided the cases into groups, some to be tried
in federal court, others in state court. Judge Rubin certified a federal class
action involving the claims against most defendants,"1 and Judge Diskin cer-
tified a state class action involving the remaining defendants. The cases pro-
ceeded to trials and verdicts in the two courts.5 2
3. Chicago Air Crash
On May 25, 1979, a DC-10 aircraft departing O'Hare International Air-
port in Chicago en route to Los Angeles crashed shortly after takeoff, killing
273 people and injuring several others. Eventually more than 150 wrongful
death and personal injury suits were either fied in or removed to federal
court, all based on diversity jurisdiction. The JPML transferred all the cases
to Judges Edwin A. Robson and Hubert L. Will of the Northern District of
Illinois for consolidated pretrial proceedings.5 3 A number of suits remained
in the state courts, including a cluster of seventy that were assigned to Judge
Rafael H. Galceran in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The state
and federal judges devised a joint discovery program, and exchanged infor-
mation pertaining to settlement efforts. The cases that did not settle were
tried in their respective systems, with the federal cases remanded to the dis-
trict in which they had been originally filed or to which they had been
removed.
5 4
51 Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1977).
52 See In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 639 F. Supp. 915, 916 (E.D. Ky. 1986). Judge Rubin
was succeeded by Judge Henry Rupert Wilhoit Jr. of the Eastern District of Kentucky when
that court's docket permitted. Id. at 917.
53 In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., on May 25, 1979, 476 F. Supp. 445 (J.P.M.L.
1979).
54 See Airline Disaster Litig. Report, 127 F.R.D. 405, 419 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (Liaison
Counsel's final report and summary of proceedings).
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4. Hyatt Skywalk Cases
On June 17, 1981, two walkways in the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas
City, Missouri collapsed, killing more than 100 people and injuring over 200.
Roughly twenty cases were filed in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri and over 100 in Missouri state court. The state
cases were assigned to Judge Timothy D. O'Leary and the federal cases to
Judge Scott 0. Wright.55 The two judges coordinated discovery and dis-
cussed, but eventually abandoned, the idea of a joint state-federal trial.
Judge Wright certified a mandatory federal class action.56 His order was
vacated by the Eighth Circuit, but he later certified an opt-out class.57 Sepa-
rate trials were scheduled in state and federal courts. Eventually, separate
class-wide settlements of both the state and federal cases were reached. 8
5. Ohio Asbestos Litigation
During the early 1980s, asbestos claims were beginning to crowd a
number of federal and state court dockets. Two judges in Ohio, Thomas D.
Lambros of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio and James J. McMonagle of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common
Pleas, determined that coordinating their asbestos cases would reduce cost
and delay. In June 1983, all eighty asbestos cases in the Northern District
were transferred to Judge Lambros' docket;59 approximately fifty cases were
pending before Judge McMonagle at that time. The two judges decided to
coordinate every stage of litigation, with the state court tracking the federal
court's formal case management plan." Judge McMonagle grouped and
moved his cases to correspond to the treatment of the federal cases in order
55 In re Skywalk Cases, No. CV81-15244 MCF (Mo. Cir. Ct. Aug. 6, 1981) (order for
preliminary consolidation of pre-trial discovery); In re Federal Skywalk Cases, No. 81-0593-
CV-W-3 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 2, 1981) (memorandum and order).
56 In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.), vacated, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982).
57 In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 95 F.R.D. 483 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (certifying an opt-out class).
58 See In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 97 F.R.D. 380 (W.D. Mo. 1983). The Skywalk
litigation illustrates the potential for serious conflict and prejudice if proceedings go forward
independently in state and federal court without coordination. See Scott 0. Wright & Joseph
A. Colussi, The Successful Use of the Class Action Device in the Management of the Skywalks
Mass Tort Litigation, 52 UMKC L. Rev. 141 (1984) (stressing the importance of the
mandatory class action).
59 In re Ohio Asbestos Litig., No. 83-OAL (N.D. Ohio June 1, 1983) (General Order No.
67).
60 See Ohio Asbestos Litigation: Case Management Plan and Case Evaluation and
Apportionment Process, In re Ohio Asbestos Litig., No. 83-OAL (N.D. Ohio Dec. 16, 1983)
(Order No. 6). For a description of the plan, see Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional
Approach for Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 440, 480-91 (1986).
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to facilitate simultaneous settlement. The two judges participated in joint
settlement sessions in both courts, and held joint scheduling sessions and
pretrial hearings. They also coordinated discovery efforts. Coordination
proceeded until Judge McMonagle's retirement in August 1990, and contin-
ued thereafter with some of the judges who took over his asbestos caseload.
6. MGM Grand Hotel Fire
On November 21, 1980, a fire in a Las Vegas hotel/casino killed eighty-
four people and injured over 1000. Cases were filed in federal courts around
the country, and in California and Nevada state courts. In May 1981, the
JPML transferred all federal cases to the United States District Court for the
District of Nevada for consolidated pretrial proceedings. Judge Louis C.
Bechtle, of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, volunteered to sit in
Nevada and was assigned the cases. All of the cases in Nevada state courts
had been consolidated before Judge J. Charles Thompson. The two judges
engaged in extensive coordination of discovery proceedings. Their coordina-
tion extended to the settlement process as well, with an eye toward a "global
settlement," which they eventually achieved.61
Z Technical Equities Fraud
In 1986, Technical Equities Corporation, a San Jose real estate and invest-
ment firm, went bankrupt, leaving 1200 investors with losses of over $150
million on investments in stocks, partnership interests, and short-term notes.
Several hundred lawsuits were filed alleging fraud by the corporation's
officers and directors. Additional suits were filed against accounting firms,
banks, and insurance companies for aiding and abetting the alleged fraudu-
lent conduct. Most of the cases were brought in California state court and
eventually consolidated before Judge Conrad Rushing. A handful of cases
were filed in federal court, and assigned to Judge William A. Ingram of the
Northern District of California.
62
Judge Rushing appointed a settlement master for the state cases. The
master enlisted the cooperation of Judge Ingram and Bankruptcy Judge
Lloyd King (along with Judge Rushing) in an effort to achieve a global set-
tlement. Judge Rushing also appointed a state discovery master. Later,
Judge Ingram appointed the same special discovery master for the federal
cases. As a result, the two courts coordinated discovery. Two groups of
state cases, using test-group plaintiffs and applying the findings to similarly
61 In re MGM Grand Hotel Fire Litig., 570 F. Supp. 913, 917 (D. Nev. 1983).
62 See In re Technical Equities Fed. See. Litig., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCII) 94,093 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
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situated plaintiffs, have been tried-one in 1988, the other in 1990. A settle-
ment of the federal cases was reached in July 1991.63
8. L'Ambiance Plaza Collapse
On April 23, 1987, L'Ambiance Plaza, a high-rise building under con-
struction in Bridgeport, Connecticut, collapsed, killing twenty-eight people
and injuring sixteen. Five cases were filed in federal court and assigned to
Judge Warren W. Eginton, and others were filed in state court. Judge
Eginton approached Federal Judge Robert C. Zampano, an alternative dis-
pute resolution (ADR) specialist, about the possibility of using ADR.
Believing that any settlement would have to include both the state and the
federal cases, Judge Zampano formulated a plan for coordinated settlement
of all cases. The state cases were assigned for discovery to Judge James T.
Healey and for settlement to Judge Frank S. Meadow. Judges Zampano and
Meadow put in place a mediation procedure for both the state and federal
cases, while Judges Eginton and Healey coordinated discovery and held joint
hearings. Eventually a global settlement was achieved.6'
9. Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litigation
After New York enacted two statutory changes in 1986,65 its state and
federal courts were inundated with asbestos-related lawsuits. By February
1988, over 5000 asbestos cases were pending in state and federal courts,
many of them identical suits involving the same parties.66 The federal cases
fied in the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York were all consoli-
dated before Judge Charles P. Sifton of the Eastern District of New York.
The cases filed in the state courts in the five counties of the City of New
York were eventually consolidated before Justice Helen E. Freedman. By
63 For the history of this litigation, see Howard Mintz, Judge OKs Settlement in Technical
Equities Case, The Recorder, July 31, 1991, at 6; see also Industrial Indem. Co. v. Superior
Court, 262 Cal. Rptr. 544 (1989) (giving brief history of case to date).
64 See In re L'Ambiance Plaza Litig., No. B-87-290(WWE) (D. Conn. & Conn. Super. Ct.
Dec. 1, 1988) (Special Settlement Proceedings).
65 Prior to 1986, causes of action accrued at the time of exposure to a harmful substance,
but discovery of the injury often did not occur until long after the three-year statute of
limitations had expired. The Toxic Tort Revival Statute substituted the date of discovery of an
injury as the date on which the statute of limitations began to run for cases in which discovery
occurred after July 1, 1986. The statute also created a one-year window, from July 30, 1986,
to July 30, 1987, in which individuals could file previously time-barred claims for harms
caused by five substances including asbestos. Act of July 30, 1986, ch. 682, 1986 N.Y. Session
Laws 1565 (McKinney 1986).
66 Some plaintiffs bring identical actions in both systems either to hedge their bets (because
one of the suits could be dismissed for a jurisdictional or procedural defect) or to gauge the
early progress of the cases in the two systems and then pursue the more promising one.
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that time Judge Sifton had a management plan in place. Justice Freedman
issued a management plan for the state cases modeled on the federal plan.67
The two judges made sure that they and the litigants were kept abreast of
related actions pending in each other's court system. They also coordinated
their motion rulings, with each court sending a copy of its memoranda and
orders to the other court, which would often follow the outcome and reason-
ing when ruling on similar motions.
As the cases were proceeding to trial in the separate systems, Federal
Judge Jack B. Weinstein suggested a consolidated state and federal court
trial, presided over by Justice Freedman and himself, involving all cases that
arose from exposure to asbestos at the Brooklyn Navy Yard. In January
1990, the Brooklyn Navy Yard cases on Judge Sifton's docket, and those of
other federal judges, were transferred to Judge Weinstein.68 Judge Wein-
stein and Justice Freedman coordinated all pretrial matters,6 9 including set-
tlement negotiations. They considered holding a joint state-federal trial, but
eventually decided to try the cases separately, ° in part because most of the
cases had already settled.
1. The Exxon- Valdez Oil Spill
On March 24, 1989, the tanker Exxon-Valdez ran aground and ruptured
on Bligh Reef (approximately twenty-five miles from the southern end of the
Trans-Alaska Pipeline), releasing over eleven million gallons of crude oil
into the waters of Prince William Sound. During the ensuing months, the
oil spread widely, contaminating waters, killing fish and other animals, and
affecting the livelihood of many people. The spill led to assorted criminal
and civil actions brought by the federal government, the State of Alaska, and
the Native Alaskan Villages. In addition, private citizens filed hundreds of
suits in both state and federal courts. The private claims were based on
common law and on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act and par-
allel state legislation. The majority of the federal actions were consolidated
before Judge H. Russel Holland of the United States District Court for the
67 See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
68 This process was facilitated by a January 23, 1990 order of Second Circuit Chief Judge
James L. Oakes, temporarily designating Jack B. Weinstein to sit in the Southern District. See
In re Eastern and S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 772 F. Supp. 1380, 1385 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(noting the designation of Judge Weinstein).
69 See In re Joint E. and S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 129 F.R.D. 434 (E. & S.D.N.Y. & N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1990) (appointment of Special Master/Referee); In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos
Litig., 737 F. Supp. 735 (E. & S.D.N.Y. & N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (denying motion to disqualify
special master); In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 123 B.R. 7 (E. & S.D.N.Y. & N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1990).
70 See In re New York City Asbestos Litig., No. 40,000 (E. & S.D.N.Y. & N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Sept. 12, 1990) (order that state and federal cases proceed separately).
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District of Alaska. The state actions were consolidated before Judge Brian
Shortell.
Judges Shortell and Holland have engaged in extensive coordination of all
pretrial matters, sometimes conducting joint hearings, and are currently
developing a schedule to coordinate the state and federal cases in the trial
phase.
11. Sioux City Air Crash
On July 19, 1989, a United Airlines flight from Denver to Chicago
crashed at Sioux City, Iowa, killing 112 people. Cases were filed in state and
federal courts around the country. Many were filed in Illinois state courts,
and these were assigned to Judge Donald P. O'Connell. The JPML trans-
ferred all federal cases to Judge Suzanne B. Conlon of the Northern District
of Illinois for consolidated pretrial proceedings. That court was chosen, in
part, to "facilitate coordination among the federal and Illinois state court
actions."71 The two courts coordinated discovery, kept one another updated
on all activity in their respective courts, and aimed for consistent rulings.
The cases eventually settled or were remanded to the districts in which they
were originally filed.
A number of factors motivated the judges in these cases to coordinate
their proceedings.72 Some sought to prevent the "great duplication of effort
and money" that would result "if both court systems were going to conduct
discovery and hold hearings and . . . settlement negotiations. '7 3 Other
judges worried that if the cases proceeded separately, scheduling conflicts or
other tensions between the court systems would impede their progress.7 4
Still others were motivated by a desire for consistency in the state and fed-
71 In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, on July 19, 1989, 128 F.R.D. 131, 133
(J.P.M.L. 1989).
72 For some, the advantages of coordination were self-evident. Judge McMonagle recalls
that it was "common sense to work together in the spirit of some type of cooperation."
Interview with James J. McMonagle, Former Judge, Cuyahoga County Court of Common
Pleas, Cleveland, Ohio (June 28, 1991) (on file with the Federal Judicial Center, Washington,
D.C.). For Judge Rubin, deciding to manage the Beverly Hills litigation jointly with Judge
Diskin was "like two plus two," because there was no other conceivable way to proceed.
Interview with Carl B. Rubin, United States District Court Judge, Southern District of Ohio
(July 5, 1991) (on file with the Federal Judicial Center, Washington, D.C.).
73 Interview with J. Charles Thompson, Judge, Eighth District Court of the State of Nevada
in and for the County of Clark (July 17, 1991) (on file with the Federal Judicial Center,
Washington, D.C.).
74 Knowing what the other judge is doing helps a court avoid interfering with the other's
arrangements. Judge Holland says that he and Judge Shortell "are each endeavoring to be
certain that we do not needlessly do anything that is going to get in the way of someone in the
other court." Interview with H. Russel Holland, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
1706 [Vol. 78:1689
HeinOnline -- 78 Va. L. Rev.  1706 1992
1992] Judicial Federalism in Action 1707
eral treatment of the cases in order to ensure comparable outcomes for simi-
larly situated parties.7" Finally, a few judges believed that coordination
would help them take charge of their cases.76 Mass litigation can present an
awesome managerial task, and when judges work together they can jointly
develop strategies to manage the litigation and can reinforce each other's
strategies.
77
The discussion that follows confirms these views; coordinating state and
federal cases accomplished important objectives. What follows is a descrip-
tion of how coordination was implemented and how it fared at each stage.
B. Discovery
Discovery creates the greatest need and presents the greatest opportunity
for coordination. Virtually all judges and attorneys who have participated in
cases involving intersystem coordination agree that duplicative discovery-
serving the same interrogatories on the same parties, taking depositions on
the same matters of the same witnesses, and producing the same documents
and physical evidence in two courts rather than a common depository-is
enormously wasteful.78 Thus, judges who want to streamline the litigation
process frequently agree that they will "first and foremost"79 coordinate dis-
covery proceedings, and most attorneys are eager to assist. Intersystem
coordination of discovery can be achieved in various ways. Though treated
separately below, the different methods of coordination are by no means
mutually exclusive.
the District of Alaska, in Naples, Fla. (May 14, 1991) (on ifie with the Federal Judicial Center,
Washington, D.C.).
75 Interview with Helen E. Freedman, Justice, New York Supreme Court, First Judicial
District, in New York, N.Y. (July 11, 1991) (on file with the Federal Judicial Center,
Washington, D.C.). Coordination reduces the opportunity for parties to play "one [court]
against the other because the two judges, state and federal, [are] combined." Interview with
Thomas D. Lambros, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio, in Naples, Fla. (May 14, 1991) (on file with the Federal Judicial Center, Washington,
D.C.). Judge Weinstein describes coordination as preventing parties from "put[ting] a wedge
between" the two court systems and causing "whipsaws between the state and federal judges."
Interview with Jack B. Weinstein, Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York, in New York, N.Y. (May 16, 1991) (on fie with the Federal Judicial Center,
Washington, D.C.).
76 See, e.g., Interview with Judge Carl. B. Rubin, supra note 72.
77 As one judge put it, "anytime a judge is at all hesitant, the lawyers will kill him." Id.
78 Even defendants who may have incentives to prolong the litigation process often agree
that discovery is not the appropriate vehicle. Because discovery in mass litigation is complex,
with numerous plaintiffs requesting similar documents and information, it is in defendants'
interest to strive for efficiency and avoid undue burdens.
79 Interview with Chief Judge H. Russel Holland, supra note 74.
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1. Joint Scheduling
The most basic form of coordination, which took place in the early stages
of many of the cases we studied, involves scheduling discovery to proceed in
tandem. This enables lawyers to prepare simultaneously for discovery in
both courts, and gives judges an opportunity to exchange information and
discuss discovery matters. Joint scheduling may also extend to other kinds
of coordination, such as sharing resources, including special masters and
document depositories. Such an arrangement also enhances the chances of a
global settlement, 0 because all the parties are at the same stage of discovery
and privy to the same information, and thus are more likely to make similar
assessments about their prospects.
In the Exxon-Valdez litigation, the state and federal judges together met
with all the attorneys involved in the civil cases to discuss the organization
of the litigation and the potential for state-federal coordination. Following
the initial conference, the judges entered identical orders in which they noted
that scheduling and planning for the state and federal cases "should, to the
maximum degree feasible, proceed in tandem.""1 Similarly, in the Sioux
City air crash cases, Judge Conlon developed a discovery schedule that was
later adopted by the state court.
Joint scheduling is not a one-time occurrence. Because the progress of
litigation cannot be fully anticipated at the outset, ongoing attention and
scheduling adjustments will generally be necessary.
2. Joint Discovery Plan
In some instances joint state-federal discovery plans have been developed.
This gives a common structure to the discovery process and paves the way
for extensive coordination. The courts can either craft a discovery plan
themselves or, as in the Exxon-Valdez litigation, 2 direct counsel to do so.
In the Ohio asbestos litigation, Judge Lambros appointed two special mas-
ters to develop a management plan for the federal cases. This plan provided
for truncated discovery to gather information necessary for individual case
evaluation and settlement negotiations. Although the state court did not
formally adopt this plan, Judge McMonagle issued an order announcing the
state court's commitment to cooperate fully with it. In a jointly issued fed-
8o See infra text accompanying notes 105-35.
81 See In re the Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095 Civil (D. Alaska Aug. 25, 1989) (Pre-Trial
Order No. 4).
82 In that case, the state and federal judges asked the attorneys to formulate a discovery
plan that was subsequently adopted by both courts. It called for joint depositions and the joint
appointment of a special discovery master. See In re the Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095 Civil (D.
Alaska Feb. 9, 1990) (Discovery Order No. 2); Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Litigation, No. 3AN-
89-2533 Civil (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 9, 1990) (Pre-Trial Order No. 13).
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eral-state memorandum of accord, Judges Lambros and McMonagle
expressed their "desire that there be a coordinated and uniform treatment of
the asbestos cases pending before [their] two courts, and that the approach
developed by the Special Masters will aid in the resolution of cases on both
dockets."
83
Even without adopting a full-fledged common plan, state and federal
courts can issue orders establishing a degree of coordination during discov-
ery. In the Florida Everglades litigation, the courts created a master list of
all litigants involved in the state and federal cases, and developed a proce-
dure to allow each party to participate in all discovery proceedings.84 Simi-
larly, in the Brooklyn Navy Yard litigation, the state and federal judges
required litigants to inform each other of related actions pending in the other
system, and provided for joint listing of and attendance at depositions.
3. Common Discovery Master
State and federal courts may make a joint appointment of a special master
to supervise discovery in both state and federal cases. A common discovery
master can help reduce duplicative discovery and ensure consistency by
establishing common standards and procedures for the state and federal
cases. This, in turn, reduces the incentive for forum shopping and provides
guidance on how future matters will be handled.85
Federal magistrates have often been chosen to serve in this capacity.8 6 In
the Brooklyn Navy Yard litigation, Judge Weinstein and Justice Freedman
designated a federal magistrate to settle discovery disputes for both courts.
In the MGM Hotel litigation, prior to state-federal coordination, the federal
judge appointed a federal magistrate to hear discovery matters.87 Later,
when the state and federal cases were coordinated, the federal magistrate
ruled on both state and federal matters.
Separate appointments of a common discovery master can achieve many
of the benefits of a joint appointment. In the Technical Equities litigation,
the state and federal judges, at separate times, appointed the same individual
83 In re Ohio Asbestos Litig. (N.D. Ohio & Ct. C.P. Cuyahoga County July 14, 1983)
(Federal-State Memorandum of Accord on Asbestos Litigation).
84 In re Aircrash Disaster at Fla. Everglades on Dec. 29, 1972, 360 F. Supp. 1394, 1396-97
(J.P.M.L. 1973).
85 As one master explains, discovery masters develop a "track record," and "word gets
around" and "lawyers act accordingly." Interview with James McManis, Esq. (Sept. 12, 1991)
(on file with the Federal Judicial Center, Washington, D.C.). Mr. McManis served as special
master for both the state and federal court to facilitate discovery in the Technical Equities
litigation.
86 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 (authorizing magistrates to handle pretrial matters).
87 In re MGM Grand Hotel Fire Litig., 570 F. Supp. 913, 917 (D. Nev. 1983) (citing
Pretrial Order No. 6).
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to oversee discovery matters in their respective courts. The master devel-
oped common procedures for both state and federal discovery, and also pro-
vided other valuable services. He had contact with both the state and federal
judges and acted as a liaison between them. In addition, because the master
was aware of the discovery undertaken in both the state and federal litiga-
tion, if a witness had already been deposed, the master would so inform any
other party seeking to depose that witness. In general, he encouraged all
counsel to read and familiarize themselves with the record in an effort to
avoid plowing the same ground."8 The discovery master helped coordinate
the proceedings of the state and federal courts even when more extensive
coordination between the judges was not feasible.
The appointment of a joint special master is often difficult. Rule 53(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that appointment of a master
"shall be the exception and not the rule" and specifies the only instances in
which such an appointment is justified: 1) in a jury trial if "the issues are
complicated"; 2) in a bench trial "upon a showing that some exceptional
condition requires it"; or 3) in any cases where the parties consent to having
a federal magistrate serve as master.8 9 Despite the textual limitations, use of
special masters "has proliferated in a wide variety of situations, only a few of
which are expressly contemplated by the Rule."90 Furthermore, differences
among federal courts' and state courts' authority to appoint masters may
frustrate a joint state-federal appointment.91 In the Ohio asbestos litigation,
for example, no joint appointment was made because State Judge
McMonagle did not think he had the authority to appoint a special master.
4. Joint Use of Discovery Materials
Regardless of whether the cases are proceeding in accordance with coordi-
nated schedules, under a common plan, or using a common special master,
the courts can ensure that material discovered in one case can be used in
companion cases. Courts may simply accept discovery initially (or concur-
rently) developed in other cases. Several courts have issued orders providing
that discovery taken in another court's case could be used in the proceedings
of the court issuing the order.92 These orders can apply to all forms of dis-
covery or be limited in scope. In the Chicago air crash litigation, for exam-
88 Interview with Norman Blears, Esq., Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliff, Palo Alto, Cal.
(Sept. 12, 1991) (on file with the Federal Judicial Center, Washington, D.C.).
89 Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
90 Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 18, at 301.
91 For example, in Arizona a master may be appointed for bench trials only. Ariz. R. Civ.
P. 53(a). But see infra text accompanying notes 127-32.
92 See, e.g., In re New York City Asbestos Litig., No. 40000 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. March 25,
1988) (Case Management Order No. 1).
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ple, the state and federal courts agreed to accept discovery material
developed in the other court pertaining to liability.9 3
Judges generally have been willing to allow depositions taken in a case in
one court system to be used in related cases pending in the other. In some
instances, such as the Beverly Hills Supper Club litigation, the courts sug-
gested, but did not insist on, joint depositions. Other courts have prohibited
litigants from duplicating depositions in companion cases. In the Brooklyn
Navy Yard litigation, the judges experimented with each of these methods.
State defendants were originally given the option of attending depositions
conducted by federal defendants or deposing the same parties at another
time. Justice Freedman later ordered all state defendants to appear for fed-
eral depositions in all cases filed in both courts, however, stating that failure
of counsel to participate in those depositions would be deemed a waiver of
discovery.
Attorneys tend to approve of joint depositions and sometimes agree to
them even when not required. In the Exxon-Valdez litigation, the attorneys'
discovery plan specifically provided for common depositions. In the Hyatt
Skywalk litigation, a State-Federal Liaison Committee, composed of law-
yers, voluntarily coordinated the taking of depositions for both the state and
federal cases.94 Similarly, in the Beverly Hills Supper Club litigation, the
attorneys agreed that all depositions could be used in both the federal and
state actions, and conducted some joint state-federal depositions.95
State and federal courts have also coordinated the use of interrogatories.
In the Brooklyn Navy Yard litigation, for example, the state court's case
management plan provided that interrogatories filed in the federal court
would apply to all cases pending in the state court. In the Hyatt Skywalk
cases, the State-Federal Liaison Committee was given the task of drafting
interrogatories applicable to cases pending in both the state and federal
systems.
In some instances, state and federal courts have created common docu-
ment and physical evidence retention plans. These plans generally provide
for joint depositories accessible to all federal and state counsel and parties.
These depositories can be supervised by both the state and federal courts or
can be maintained by one court with the other making use of the facilities.
93 See, e.g., Airline Disaster Litigation Report-Uniform Damage Rules Needed, 127
F.R.D. 405 (1988) (Liaison Counsel's final report and summary of proceedings in In re Air
Crash Disaster Near Chicago, IlL, on May 25, 1979).
94 Interview with Timothy D. O'Leary, Judge, Circuit Court of Jackson County, Mo., (Sept.
9, 1991) (on file with the Federal Judicial Center, Washington, D.C.). See infra text
accompanying notes 223-25.
95 Interview with Judge Carl B. Rubin, supra note 72.
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5. Joint Discovery Hearings
Some judges have recognized that although not all aspects of the related
cases could be aggregated in one court, important matters could be heard in
a single proceeding. In the Beverly Hills Supper Club litigation, for exam-
ple, Judges Rubin and Diskin frequently sat "together on the bench' 9 6 and
heard discovery motions. They sat together every two or three months to
dispose of all disputes. In the L'Ambiance Plaza litigation, Judge Zampano
recognized the importance of having a state counterpart for Judge Eginton,
who was handling discovery for the federal cases. He communicated this
view to the Chief Court Administrator for the State of Connecticut, and
subsequently all state cases were assigned for discovery purposes to Superior
Court Judge James T. Healey. Alternating between the state and federal
courts, Judges Healey and Eginton met with attorneys and conducted joint
discovery hearings. More recently, in the Brooklyn Navy Yard litigation,
Judge Weinstein and Justice Freedman, along with the federal magistrate
appointed to handle discovery disputes, sat together on numerous occasions.
These discovery hearings are discussed below in connection with joint pre-
trial hearings generally. Here, it is sufficient to note that because the discov-
ery issues that arise in state and federal courts are generally similar, joint
hearings are possible and can help dispose of matters expeditiously.
6. Resolving Differences
Although state and federal procedural and evidentiary rules sometimes
differ, these differences have generally not impeded coordination of discov-
ery. Judges who coordinate proceedings find that state and federal discovery
rules are usually compatible.97 In the Exxon-Valdez litigation, for example,
Judge Holland found it easy to have one special master handle discovery for
both courts because the federal and the Alaska state rules are essentially the
same.98 In the L'Ambiance Plaza litigation, Judges Eginton and Healey
found that carefully wording texts and exchanging drafts enabled them to
formulate orders that satisfied both the state and federal rules.99
At times, judges have avoided conflict by maintaining an "open" discov-
ery policy. As one judge involved in the Florida Everglades litigation
recalls, "what went on in discovery wasn't going to have a thing to do with
96 Id.
97 See Daniel J. Meador, Are We Heading for a Merger of Federal and State Courts?, 17
Judges' J. 9, 47 (1978) ("Some 40 states have adopted rules of civil procedure which are
virtually identical to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Greater uniformity in the law of
evidence may likewise follow the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence.").
98 Interview with Chief Judge H. Russel Holland, supra note 74.
99 They issued separate orders, but with the same text.
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whether [material] was admissible as evidence [in court]."'l"° Differences in
procedures and rules were thus glossed over early in the litigation and differ-
ences in interpretation or application of rules were rare. One judge involved
in a cooperative scheme remarked that most decisions were so "obvious"
that anyone would have decided them the same way. 101
When conflicts did arise, judges employed a variety of mechanisms to
resolve them. Where federal procedures differed significantly from state pro-
cedures, some courts agreed to apply federal law to all discovery matters,
presumably because the federal rules tend to be more liberal. 0 2
A policy of deference often forestalls possible conflict. In the Sioux City
litigation, a dispute arose over whether certain documents sought during dis-
covery were protected by the attorney-client privilege or work product rule.
The issue was raised first in the federal court and decided by a federal magis-
trate. Perceiving the need for consistency, State Judge O'Connell issued an
order similar to the one issued by the federal court. Similarly, during the
early stages of the Brooklyn Navy Yard litigation, State Supreme Court Jus-
tice Freedman often deferred to the discovery rulings issued by the federal
court, which was further along in the litigation. (She did, however, remain
involved in the decisiomaking process-the state and federal judges main-
tained contact and conferred about these matters prior to several federal
court rulings.)
In some cases, especially the earlier ones, the federal court took the lead in
handling all discovery matters. In the MGM Hotel Fire litigation, all dis-
covery was supervised by Federal Judge Bechtle. State Judge Thompson
issued an order providing that discovery pertaining to liability issues in the
state cases be "made in, conducted through, and governed by" the federal
litigation. 10 3 He ruled that all depositions and documents generated from
state cases had to be filed in the federal court rather than the state court. All
motions were heard by the federal judge. A similar situation developed in
the Florida Everglades litigation. Because the federal cases were proceeding
at a faster pace than those in the state court, Federal Judge Fay heard all
motions regarding discovery matters; the state court automatically ratified
100 Interview with Peter T. Fay, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
in Miami, Fla. (May 13, 1991) (on fie with the Federal Judicial Center, Washington, D.C.).
101 Interview with Justice Helen E. Freedman, supra note 75.
102 Judge Weinstein and Justice Freedman decided that discovery for the Brooklyn Navy
Yard cases would proceed under federal law and would be used in both the state and federal
cases. Interview with Judge Jack B. Weinstein, supra note 75. In the Beverly Hills Supper
Club litigation, conflicts arising during joint depositions were resolved by a federal magistrate
applying federal law.
103 In re MGM Grand Hotel Fire, No. A201150 (Nev. Dist. Ct. for Clark County Sept. 26,
1981) (First Pre-Trial Order).
1992] 1713
HeinOnline -- 78 Va. L. Rev.  1713 1992
Virginia Law Review
his orders unless counsel objected. As discussed below, federal courts often
have institutional advantages, greater resources, and more flexible tools for
aggregating their own cases that may make it advisable for them to take the
lead in discovery.
Conflicts can also be avoided through specialization rather than deference.
Judge O'Leary recounts that during the Hyatt Skywalk litigation, the federal
judge would rule on matters raised by the federal case attorneys, and the
state judge would rule on matters raised by state case attorneys. The judges
and attorneys in that litigation also developed a "golden rule": before attor-
neys could raise a discovery matter with the judges, the attorneys had to try
to resolve it among themselves. As a result, Judge O'Leary recalls, few dis-
covery disputes reached the judges."°
C. Settlement
Intersystem coordination will sometimes achieve a global settlement
resolving the entire litigation. Even when judges do not actively involve
themselves in the settlement process, coordination efforts in other areas can
facilitate settlement. In the Hyatt Skywalk litigation, for example, all the
state and federal parties were brought together by certification of a federal
class action."0 5 Though later vacated, the certification contributed to the
achievement of a global settlement.
Many judges have come to recognize that settlement of mass tort actions
in either state or federal court requires settling the cases in both systems.
Judge Zampano observes that the defendants in the L'Ambiance Plaza litiga-
tion would not have been interested in settling the federal cases had they
been required to go to trial in the state cases." 6 Judge Bechtle encountered
the same attitude in the MGM litigation.0 7 Accordingly, in several major
cases, state and federal judges have combined resources to effect a settlement
of all the cases pending in both court systems. They have used a range of
mechanisms for settlement coordination.
104 Interview with Judge Timothy D. O'Leary, supra note 94.
105 In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.), vacated, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982).
106 Interview with Robert C. Zampano, Senior Judge, United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut, in New Haven, Conn. (May 31, 1991) (on file with the Federal
Judicial Center, Washington, D.C.).
107 Interview with Louis C. Bechtle, Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, in Naples, Fla. (May 15, 1991) (sitting by designation in the District
of Nevada) (on file with the Federal Judicial Center, Washington, D.C.).
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L Joint Alternative Dispute Resolution
The L'Ambiance Plaza litigation demonstrates that alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) methods may be successfully applied to related mul-
tiforum litigation. The state and federal judges collaborated in applying
ADR techniques, and settled the many cases lo' within eleven months. An
analysis of their efforts provides insight into effective coordination.
Shortly after the federal cases were assigned to Judge Eginton, he spoke
with Judge Zampano, the court's ADR specialist, about whether ADR was
appropriate for this litigation. Although the court's ADR program had
apparently never been applied to mass tort litigation, they decided to
attempt mediation.
Judge Zampano soon recognized that resolution of the cases required the
involvement of both the federal and state courts. He contacted Judge Aaron
Ment, the Chief Court Administrator for the State of Connecticut, who
readily agreed that coordination would be beneficial. Judge Ment subse-
quently assigned the state cases to Superior Court Judge Meadow for settle-
ment purposes. Judge Zampano recalls that, during his initial meeting with
Judge Meadow to discuss coordinated settlement efforts, they succeeded in
"set[ting] up a program in our own minds," involving an "overall structure"
for the mediation process."° The first phase involved persuading counsel
not to pursue further litigation in either state or federal court but rather to
participate fully in settlement efforts. Judge Zampano sent a letter to all
parties notifying them of "a series of mediation sessions" to be conducted by
himself and Judge Meadow, acting as the "L'Ambiance Plaza Litigation
State-Federal Mediation Panel."" The notice requested that all parties
refrain from pretrial proceedings except those necessitated by time limita-
tions, and stated that, although there was "no legal obligation" for them to
participate in the mediation sessions, there was a "strong social and moral
obligation to do so.""'
108 The litigation involved a multitude of parties. Potential defendants included the
developer of the building complex, construction contractors, subcontractors, architects,
engineers, and insurers, as well as the City of Bridgeport. Numerous plaintiffs filed wrongful
death and personal injury suits, and some of the defendants in the tort suits became plaintiffs in
contract claim actions.
109 Interview with Judge Robert C. Zampano, supra note 106.
110 Letter from Robert C. Zampano, Senior Judge, United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut, to the parties to the L'Ambiance Plaza Litigation 1 (Jan. 25, 1988) (on
file with the Federal Judicial Center, Washington, D.C.).
HI Id. at 3.
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Judges Zampano and Meadow began conducting unofficial discovery of
their own. Using reports resulting from several investigations112 as a start-
ing point, they held a series of meetings with the attorneys, experts, and
insurers. Through these "get acquainted" sessions, the judges gathered
information that provided a foundation for the settlement recommendations
they would eventually make. They stressed that any conclusions they
reached were for settlement purposes only.'
13
Connecticut law required the participation in the settlement process of
several other jurisdictions in addition to the state and federal courts. The
Connecticut Probate Court would have to approve settlement provisions in
death cases, and the Workers Compensation Commission would have to




Judge Zampano contacted the Chief of the Probate System, who, following
Judge Zampano's recommendation, assigned all of the cases to one probate
judge. Also at Judge Zampano's request, the Chairman of the Connecticut
Workers Compensation Commission had all of the relevant cases assigned to
himself and one other commissioner.
One jurisdictional overlap caused more serious complications. While the
Mediation Panel's settlement efforts were getting under way, five of the
L'Ambiance defendants were contesting citations and fines issued by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) before an adminis-
trative law judge for the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commis-
sion sitting in Boston. Those defendants expressed concern about
participating in the settlement proceedings before the Mediation Panel while
at the same time vigorously defending themselves before the Commission.
Judge Zampano called the judge, who agreed to stay proceedings.
After five months of investigation, Judges Zampano and Meadow decided
to jointly interview the plaintiffs in the death and personal injury cases to
determine the minimum amount required for a settlement "pot." During
the ensuing weeks, forty-four plaintiffs met with the judges in Judge
Zampano's chambers and described the impact of the tragedy on their
112 These included investigations by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
and the Connecticut state police.
113 Judges Zampano and Meadow made no official findings of fact, nor did they decide any
legal issues. As Judge Zampano recounts, "we decided that we were not going to have legal
problems influence our settlement discussions." Interview with Judge Robert C. Zampano,
supra note 106. Judge Zampano admits that "[t]his may seem strange coming from judges,"
id., but, as Judge Meadow concludes, "the role that we played was really a quasi-judicial role."
Interview with Frank S. Meadow, Judge, Superior Court of Connecticut, in New Haven,
Conn. (May 31, 1991) (on file with the Federal Judicial Center, Washington, D.C.).
114 See In re L'Ambiance Plaza Litig., No. B-87-290(WWE) (D. Conn. & Conn. Super. Ct.
Dec. 1, 1988) (Special Settlement Proceedings).
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lives.115 After every interview, each judge wrote down what he considered a
fair settlement figure for that plaintiff. They then discussed how they arrived
at the figure, and reached a consensus on an appropriate settlement amount.
These figures were incorporated into forty-four separate opinions, drafted by
Judge Zampano and reviewed by Judge Meadow.
A final settlement also required resolution of property damage and con-
tract claims arising from the collapse. Five defendants were still unwilling to
settle while still facing proposed OSHA fines totalling more than five million
dollars. Judges Zampano and Meadow met several times with OSHA
officers in a continuing effort to reach an agreement acceptable to both
OSHA and the five defendants. OSHA eventually agreed to reduce fines to
$425,000, which became part of the settlement pot. The structure of the
settlement was essentially established.
Judges Zampano and Meadow still needed the formal approval of all juris-
dictions involved. Judge Zampano planned an en masse settlement hearing
involving the District Court, Superior Court, Probate Court, Workers Com-
pensation Commission, and Occupational Safety and Health Review Com-
mission. Prior to this hearing, Judge Zampano met with the participating
judges and officials to discuss the procedures for convening the five forums
simultaneously. The settlement hearing was held in the Federal Building in
New Haven, and in just over three hours the L'Ambiance settlement was
approved by all concerned parties, courts, and agencies, and all orders were
signed by the appropriate officials.
1 16
Many factors contributed to the successful settlement of the L'Ambiance
cases. First, Judge Zampano ensured that all cases pending in each jurisdic-
tion were aggregated before no more than two judges or officials. Equally
important, these individuals proved willing to cooperate with the judges and
officials of the other jurisdictions.
115 The judges conducted these interviews informally, allowing the families of the deceased
to bring with them photo albums, mementos, videotapes-anything that would help them
describe their loss.
116 On December 1, 1988, the special settlement proceedings began at 9:45 a.m. with a
standing-room-only audience of over 300 plaintiffs, defendants, attorneys, observers, and
reporters. Judge Zampano opened the session with a presentation on the background of the
cases and the proposed settlement. Afterwards, Judge Zampano and Judge Meadow took
turns presenting motions to the District Court and the Superior Court, respectively. After all
documents had been presented to the federal court and the state court, the floor was turned
over to representatives of the various forums. They each announced their approval of the
settlement and that each would go to a different area of the building during a recess to hear
any party's objections. Forty-five minutes later, the courts reconvened for final comments and
then adjourned at 1:00 p.m. See Lucy V. Katz, The L'Ambiance Plaza Mediation: A Case
Study in Judicial Settlement of Mass Torts, 5 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol., 277, 322 (1990).
1992] 1717
HeinOnline -- 78 Va. L. Rev.  1717 1992
Virginia Law Review
Early intervention was also critical. Judge Meadow emphasizes that the
parties accepted mediation because the Mediation Panel intervened early
enough-before the parties had embarked on full discovery-to hold down
the costs of litigation.117 In addition, the litigants had yet to develop hostili-
ties that might impede settlement negotiations."1 '
Another important factor was the priority Judges Zampano and Meadow
gave the L'Ambiance mediation. During the eleven months of settlement
negotiations, they met an average of three days a week, and during some
periods worked together for five full consecutive days. 119
Judge Zampano and Judge Meadow shared equally the tasks of research-
ing cases, conducting interviews, and planning settlement strategies. Even
so, Judge Zampano was able to contribute more resources to the mediation
effort because he had a larger support staff, greater financial resources, and a
more flexible docket.' 2 As a result, the federal court handled most of the
administrative aspects of the settlement process. Judge Zampano, assisted
by a law clerk and a secretary, organized the hearings, issued notices, and
maintained records. The federal system also provided the mediation panel
with a computer to facilitate mailings and record-keeping. Further, the fed-
eral courthouse became the headquarters for the mediation proceedings:
Judge Zampano's courtroom could accommodate group conferences more
easily than smaller state courtrooms and his chambers provided a more com-
fortable setting for the individual plaintiff interviews. Finally, the federal
court contributed a well-developed ADR program.
12 1
2. Joint Settlement Sessions
Coordination of settlement is possible outside an ADR or other formal
process. Such was the case in the Ohio asbestos litigation. Although the
judges in that case did not participate in a specific joint mediation program,
they worked together in implementing a litigation management plan for-
117 Interview with Judge Frank S. Meadow, supra note 113.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Judge Zampano drafted records, organized hearings, issued notices, and maintained
records. He notes that "obviously it was easier for me to accept more responsibility [for]
getting things out." Interview with Judge Robert C. Zampano, supra note 106. Judge
Meadow says, "I had to recognize right from the start that Judge Zampano and his staff were
far better equipped than any state judge could have been equipped to [handle some aspects of
the litigation]." Interview with Frank S. Meadow, supra note 113.
121 Connecticut did not have an ADR program at the time of the L'Ambiance cases, and,
according to Judge Meadow, though the state judiciary is currently developing such a
program, it is still in an embryonic stage. Interview with Frank S. Meadow, supra note 113.
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mally adopted by the federal court and tracked by the state court.122 Their
coordination was critical to the settlement of both state and federal cases.
The management plan called for grouping federal cases into "clusters"
that proceeded through a truncated discovery phase designed to gather
information necessary for case evaluation and settlement negotiations.123 To
facilitate simultaneous settlement of related federal and state cases, Judge
McMonagle grouped the state cases to correspond to the federal clusters.
He and Judge Lambros participated in joint settlement sessions. They con-
ducted "shuttle diplomacy" in settlement negotiations between the parties.
Federal Judge Lambros recalls that "it was not unusual for [Judge
McMonagle] to come over and spend the whole day with me in settlement
negotiations," and "I would go over to his court and do the same thing."12
At sessions in the federal court, Judge Lambros took the lead, whereas Judge
McMonagle presided at sessions in the state court. Interaction at the joint
sessions provided mutual reinforcement for the judges in their decisions.125
Judge Lambros also believes that he and Judge McMonagle "spoke with
more authority and credibility when we were together." 126 A significant
number of state and federal cases have settled as a result of these joint
efforts.
3. Supervision by One Judge or a Special Settlement Master
In some instances, one judge has supervised settlement for both the state
and federal courts. This type of arrangement may have the undesirable
effect of reducing the involvement of one jurisdiction. On the other hand,
concentration of authority in one individual often results in greater effi-
ciency. Such an approach has proven successful in achieving global or wide-
spread settlement in several cases.
For example, in the MGM Hotel Fire litigation, the federal court took the
lead role in a coordinated settlement process. Judge Bechtle explained that
defendants and third-party defendants considered a global settlement "the
only type of settlement which [they] would be willing to enter because of the
need to resolve all claims and end all litigation, both in federal and state
122 See In re Ohio Asbestos Litig., No. OAL (N.D. Ohio Dec. 16, 1983) (Order No. 6,
Establishment of the Case Management Plan and Case Evaluation and Apportionment
Process).
123 Id.
124 Interview with Chief Judge Thomas D. Lambros, supra note 75.
125 Judge Lambros points out that the "exchange of views" he had with Judge McMonagle
was particularly helpful in complex areas, such as determining percentages of defendant
liability in order to put together settlement pots. Id.
126 Id.
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court."' 2 7 After Judge Bechtle met individually with all of the federal and
state plaintiffs to assess the value of their cases, a global settlement was
achieved.
128
The state and federal courts can also jointly appoint a special settlement
master. In the Brooklyn Navy Yard litigation, Judge Weinstein and Justice
Freedman, after consulting with other judges in their jurisdictions and hold-
ing two lengthy meetings with plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys, issued a
joint order appointing the same individual as both referee 129 and settlement
master.' 3 Their order stressed that the "emergency nature" of the asbestos
litigation required a joint appointment and close cooperation between the
state and federal courts, and that the powers of a referee under state law and
a settlement master under federal law were in this case equivalent.' 3 '
Although an all-inclusive "global settlement" was not achieved, the efforts of
the settlement master-referee and the judges helped settle most of the
claims.
1 32
4. Informal Settlement Coordination
Even when settlement efforts are not formally coordinated by the state
and federal judges, informal coordination is possible. In the Chicago air
crash cases, the Federal Liaison Counsel reported that "[e]arly in the pro-
ceedings, the parties agreed that the [federal] Court would receive informa-
tion on a confidential basis pertaining to all settlements or verdicts, including
those outside the consolidated cases, i.e., cases filed in state court."' 133 The
federal judges were thus privy to the amounts for which the state cases were
settling. This information helped them evaluate and recommend settlements
for the federal cases and thus maintain consistency with the state cases.
127 In re MGM Grand Hotel Fire Litig., 570 F. Supp. 913, 917 (D. Nev. 1983).
128 Id. at 918-24.
129 This was done pursuant to § 4301 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules.
130 This was done pursuant to Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See In re
Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 129 F.R.D. 434 (E. & S.D.N.Y. & N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990)
(joint appointment of settlement master-referee).
131 Id. at 435; see also In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 737 F. Supp. 735 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. & N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (ruling that it is unnecessary to distinguish between state-
appointed and federal-appointed masters or referees in applying judicial ethical standards).
For a fuller description of the duties and activities of the settlement master-referee in the
Brooklyn Navy Yard litigation, see Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 18, at 301.
132 Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 18, at 301. Trials against the "hold-outs" proceeded
independently in the state and federal courts. Id.
133 Airline Disaster Litig. Report, supra note 93, at 413.
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5. Settlement-Related Coordination
Some judges have used outside specialists to handle settlement-related
matters. For example, in the Beverly Hills Supper Club litigation, the fed-
eral and state judges appointed co-trustees to deposit the settlement funds
into a federally insured institution (as opposed to court registries) so that the
plaintiffs would receive interest. The trustees worked closely together,
though they maintained separate accounts for state and federal settle-
ments."' In the L'Ambiance Plaza litigation, the state and federal courts
appointed a settlement administrator to "facilitate and implement... all of
the settlement agreements." '135
D. Joint Pretrial Hearings
Joint hearings presided over by both the state and federal judges are useful
during various phases of litigation. In addition to joint hearings held for
discovery and settlement purposes, as discussed above, judges have used
them at the outset of litigation to establish a joint case management frame-
work136 or to hear motions involving substantive matters such as class certi-
fication or summary judgment.
Joint hearings may be an integral part of the litigation scheme or simply
an efficient method of handling a particular matter. In some cases, judges
conducted numerous joint hearings, completely coordinating their related
litigation. Early in the Beverly Hills Supper Club litigation, Judge Rubin
recognized the complexity of the case and suggested to Judge Diskin that
they handle it together. They sat together every few months to handle pend-
ing matters. Justice Freedman and Judge Weinstein managed the Brooklyn
Navy Yard cases in much the same way. Joint hearings often serve more
limited purposes. In the Exxon-Valdez litigation, for example, the judges
conducted two joint hearings: one to determine the structure of overall coor-
dination and the other to resolve motions regarding state and federal class
certifications.
137
134 Interview with Judge Carl B. Rubin, supra note 72.
135 In re L'Ambiance Plaza Litig., No. B-87-290(WWE) (D. Conn. & Conn. Super. Ct. Dec.
1, 1988) (Special Settlement Proceedings, appointing Arthur S. Sachs as "special master"
under federal law and as "committee" under Connecticut state law).
136 Early in the Exxon-Valdez litigation, Judges Holland and Shortell met with all of the
attorneys involved in the civil cases to arrange a joint state-federal discovery plan and to assess
the potential for further coordination. Similarly, in the Ohio asbestos litigation, Judges
Lambros and McMonagle held joint hearings to determine whether joint state-federal special
masters could be appointed to develop a structure for the litigation.
137 See also Calvert Fire Ins. v. Will, 560 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1977) (state and federal judges
held joint oral argument on the issue of whether a participatory interest in a reinsurance pool
constituted a "security").
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Judges have found that joint hearings achieve many of the benefits of con-
solidation before one judge while maintaining the involvement and preserv-
ing the distinct interests of both the federal and state courts. Most
obviously, joint hearings conserve time and resources by avoiding duplica-
tion. As one judge explains, "What conceivable sense is there in having...
lawyers appearing in two separate courts doing the same thing twice?" '138
Joint hearings also enable judges to share information, insights, and even
case management techniques, all of which can help expedite litigation.
Joint hearings serve other purposes as well. In the Ohio asbestos litiga-
tion, Judge Lambros found joint hearings helpful in introducing the lawyers
to the "new cultural setting" of state-federal coordination. 139 The judges
wanted to demonstrate the degree of cooperation they hoped to achieve and
to make the lawyers comfortable working with both judges. Furthermore,
they wanted to encourage the lawyers to work together."4 Coordinating the
state and federal cases, Judge Lambros says, "was a good strategy to get
lawyers to cooperate and to realize that we were concerned with avoiding
duplication." 14' He notes that the visible cooperation between the state and
federal systems gave the two judges "clout" that "got the attention of the
lawyers."1 42
Two overlapping aspects of joint hearings require further exploration: the
nuts and bolts of arranging and conducting such hearings, and the kinds of
conflicts that can arise and the ways courts have dealt with them.
L The Mechanics of Joint Hearings
Joint hearings require planning to determine such logistical matters as
location, who will preside, the issues to be addressed, and the conduct of the
hearing. Sometimes this can be accomplished through regular contact in the
course of the litigation. Judges Eginton and Healey, for example, sorted out
the logistics of pretrial matters for the L'Ambiance Plaza litigation over two
lunches. Sometimes more extensive preparation is necessary. Before each
joint hearing conducted in the Brooklyn Navy Yard cases, Judge Weinstein
drafted an agenda and sent it to Justice Freedman, who would make addi-
tions. Some preparation can take place just before a hearing; Judges Eginton
138 Interview with Carl B. Rubin, supra note 72.
139 Interview with Thomas D. Lambros, supra note 75.
140 Judge McMonagle recounts that the lawyers had not been cooperating among
themselves: The "vast majority were provincial in their approach . . . [a]sserting rights of
individuals." Interview with James J. McMonagle, supra note 72. They also were unfamiliar
with the types and numbers of asbestos cases mushrooming on state and federal dockets.
141 Interview with Thomas D. Lambros, supra note 75.
142 Id.
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and Healey met in chambers immediately prior to each of their two joint
hearings.
Selecting the location for a joint hearing is not always a simple matter.
For example, the judges in the Beverly Hills Supper Club litigation origi-
nally planned to hold the joint hearings in the United States courthouse in
Kenton County, Kentucky, but then decided to use the state courthouse
when a lawyer questioned whether the state court's jurisdiction extended
beyond the geographical boundaries of its circuit. The hearings were, how-
ever, later moved to the more spacious federal courtrooms and no one
objected.
Although one system's courtrooms may be significantly larger and better
equipped than the other's, there may be symbolic value to holding joint hear-
ings in both courts. In the L'Ambiance Plaza litigation, Judge Eginton
would rather have held all joint hearings in the state courthouse, but felt that
for "public image" it was important to hold the hearings in both the state
and federal courthouses.14 3 Similarly, Judge Lambros suggested that his
first joint hearing with Judge MeMonagle in the Ohio asbestos litigation be
held at the state court because he "didn't want to create the impression that
the federal judge... was attempting to dominate the process." 144 Instead,
he wanted to demonstrate that they "were functioning as equal entities.
145
The judges held their next joint hearing in the federal court. In general,
except where one system's courtrooms were significantly better suited to
large meetings, judges have alternated between the courtrooms of both
jurisdictions. 46
Another matter that the judges should address at the outset is the services
of court employees. In the Beverly Hills Supper Club litigation, representa-
tives from both courts were present at the hearings. In the L'Ambiance
Plaza litigation, the judges employed the state court deputy, bailiff, and
court reporter for hearings conducted in the state court and their federal
counterparts for hearings in the federal court. Addressing this issue well in
advance of the hearing can help head off labor disputes.
The actual conduct of joint hearings varies substantially. Judges must
develop a pattern of conduct with respect to many small matters, such as
what to do when it becomes necessary to confer with one another. Judges
Eginton and Healey retired to chambers when the need arose. Other judges
143 Interview with Warren W. Eginton, Judge, United States District Court for the District
of Connecticut, in New Haven, Conn. (July 15, 1991) (on fie with the Federal Judicial Center,
Washington D.C.)
144 Interview with Thomas D. Lambros, supra note 75.
145 Id.
146 In the Brooklyn Navy Yard litigation, hearings were held in various locations, including
the federal and state courthouses and the Federal Court of International Trade in Manhattan.
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quietly consulted while remaining on the bench. A larger question concerns
the nature of the collaboration. In the Beverly Hills Supper Club litigation,
the judges were determined to collaborate as equals at every step. Judge
Rubin recalls that "we would simply sit together on the bench and as these
motions were heard we would each ask questions and when we were finished
we would get together and decide what to do."147 In both the Ohio asbestos
litigation and the Brooklyn Navy Yard litigation, the judge in whose court-
room the hearing was conducted would preside. Regardless of who was pre-
siding, both judges posed questions and were actively involved.14
The extent of collaboration in the decisionmaking process has varied as
well. In most instances, the judges have reached a consensus before issuing
rulings. 149 There are also several ways for the judges to approach the draft-
ing of the courts' rulings. In the Beverly Hills Supper Club litigation,
because Judge Rubin had a larger staff than Judge Diskin, he prepared drafts
of orders. The drafts were then forwarded to Judge Diskin who made any
amendments that he deemed necessary before filing the state order. In other
cases, such as the Exxon-Valdez litigation, both the state and federal judges
drafted orders that were exchanged for suggested revisions. The judges then
either issued separate orders or blended their drafts into a single order.
Of course, judges will not always be able to agree on the outcome of each
issue, especially in cases where the state and federal courts must apply differ-
ent law. We now turn our attention to the kinds of difficulties that can arise
during joint hearings, and how they can be managed.
2. Resolving Conflicts
One might expect joint state-federal hearings to encounter insuperable
problems because of differences in the rules or procedures of the state and
federal courts. In fact, such problems have been rare. State and federal
rules are often similar if not identical.'5 Even where they differ, however,
judges have been able to work within both sets of rules to resolve disputes.
"Federal rules are essentially equity based," says Judge Weinstein, and pro-
147 Interview with Carl B. Rubin, supra note 72.
148 Interview with Helen E. Freedman, supra note 75. In the Brooklyn litigation, on the few
occasions when one judge could not attend a hearing, the other conducted the proceeding.
Rulings were subsequently ratified by the absent judge. Id.
149 In the Beverly Hills, Brooklyn Navy Yard, and L'Ambiance Plaza cases, the judges
discussed the arguments, arrived at mutually satisfactory conclusions, and issued consistent
rulings. In Beverly Hills and L'Ambiance Plaza, they issued the same orders under separate
captions. Justice Freedman and Judge Weinstein went further, issuing joint rulings under both
courts' captions. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 129 F.R.D. 434
(E.D.N.Y., S.D.N.Y. & N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (jointly appointing settlement master-referee).
150 See supra text accompanying notes 97-102 (discussing absence of disputes over discovery
and noting similarity of state and federal rules).
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vide judges with "wide discretion."'151 Judge Weinstein also believes that
state law imposes few limitations, noting that New York state law did not
substantially limit his coordination efforts with Justice Freedman.
15 2
According to Judge Weinstein, "given the flexibility of the state and federal
practice and with the ingenuity of the judges and parties, there isn't any
problem [caused by conflicting rules] that can't be solved, or someone has
misinterpreted the law."15 3
Even where the state and federal rules are identical, or the differences
between them are bridgeable, judges might nevertheless disagree over the
application of the rules in a particular case. In the Brooklyn Navy Yard
cases, for example, Judge Weinstein and Justice Freedman sometimes dis-
agreed about summary judgment motions. They resolved these disagree-
ments by having the judge who had jurisdiction over the particular case
render the decision. This remains an option for state and federal judges who
cannot reach a consensus: each can issue orders pertaining to his or her own
case. In the Exxon-Valdez litigation, Judges Holland and Shortell con-
ducted a joint hearing to determine whether or not to certify class actions.
After hearing the plaintiffs' argument on certification, Judge Holland denied
their motion. Judge Shortell, however, chose to take the matter under
advisement rather than ruling at that time, and later certified several classes.
There is potential for disagreement whenever judges work together-as on
appellate panels, for example. The relationship between state and federal
judges is further complicated by the different institutional positions occupied
by the judge-, although this can often facilitate coordination. In most
instances of related multiforum litigation, the state and federal courts apply
the same substantive law-ordinarily state law-and the federal judges gen-
erally defer to the state court on state law issues.154 Judge Rubin believes
that "this matter of deference ... is critically important" to state-federal
coordination. 5 Deference to the state judge's interpretation of state law
not only draws on the judge's expertise but also ensures state court involve-
ment in a process that might otherwise be dominated by the federal court.1 56
151 Interview with Jack B. Weinstein, supra note 75.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Few judges recalled disputes in interpretation of state law, perhaps in part a function of
this deference. Judge Rubin, for example, reports that he often deferred to Judge Diskin on
issues of Kentucky law, in part because Judge Diskin was more familiar with its
"peculiarities." Interview with Carl B. Rubin, supra note 72.
155 Id.
156 For a discussion of the appropriate extent of such deference, and of state judges
deferring to federal judges on issues of federal law, see infra text accompanying notes 253-66.
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Deference will reduce but not automatically eliminate conflict between
state and federal judges. Direct conflict may be avoided by eschewing joint
hearings-at least where a conflict seems likely. For this reason, Judge
Lambros and Judge McMonagle made a point of not holding joint hearings
dealing with evidentiary matters or controlling issues. Even when joint
hearings result in divergent rulings, however, they may offer benefits such as
greater judicial economy, the added experience and insight of a second
judge, and the promotion of future cooperation.157 Thus, although disagree-
ments arose, none of the judges in either the Exxon-Valdez or Brooklyn
Navy Yard litigation regrets conducting the joint hearings.
158
Communication in the face of disagreement is critical. Judge Holland
emphasizes that although he and Judge Shortell have sometimes gone in dif-
ferent directions in the Exxon-Valdez litigation, they have not diverged with-
out first discussing what each of them was about to do.159 Furthermore,
they have not permitted their disagreements to interfere with their coopera-
tion in other areas. Judge Holland explains that if an issue "comes up
tomorrow that is the subject of a motion that is filed in both [courts], we are
going through the same drill that we have had before of having [a] joint
hearing[ ] if a hearing is needed [a]nd conferring with one another on a deci-
sion to see if we can reach a decision that is acceptable to both of us."'s'
Finally, cooperation among the judges in a joint hearing will influence the
general tone and atmosphere of the proceeding and may promote enhanced
cooperation among the attorneys involved. Such cooperation among counsel
is extremely helpful and greatly improves the likelihood of a successful hear-
ing because, as Judge Weinstein notes, attorneys who are enthusiastic about
coordination can alleviate procedural or logistical difficulties associated with
state-federal proceedings.161
157 See supra text accompanying notes 136-42.
158 See Interview with H. Russel Holland, supra note 74 (Exxon-Valdez litigation);
Interview with Brian C. Shortell, Judge, Alaska Superior Court (July 10, 1991) (on file with
the Federal Judicial Center, Washington, D.C.) (same); Interview with Jack B. Weinstein,
supra note 75 (Brooklyn Navy Yard litigation); Interview with Helen E. Freedman, supra note
75 (same).
159 Interview with H. Russel Holland, supra note 74.
160 Id. That the judges reached different conclusions with respect to class certification-
creating certain problems for the litigants---did not diminish the value of coordination to the
extent that it reduced conflict and inconsistency. Id.
161 Interview with Jack B. Weinstein, supra note 75. For example, cooperative attorneys
can stipulate to certain procedures regardless of differences between state and federal courts.
See, e.g., Interview with Peter T. Fay, supra note 100 (noting that attorneys could stipulate to
using the same six people as jurors for both the federal and state cases in a joint trial).
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E. Joint Trials
The most advanced stage of state-federal cooperation would involve a
joint trial. The Manual for Complex Litigation encourages judges to con-
sider this kind of arrangement,162 and the potential benefits are clear. Like
joint hearings, joint trials may be more efficient because the parties are
required to adduce evidence only once. A joint trial, like a joint hearing,
would also enable judges to benefit from one another's insights and
information.
Despite these advantages, none of the judges we interviewed conducted a
joint trial, which suggests that such trials may be impractical.' 63 However,
in several cases-the Hyatt Skywalk, Florida Everglades, and Brooklyn
Navy Yard litigation-the state and federal judges considered conducting a
joint trial. I" Moreover, in many respects joint trials would resemble joint
hearings, and the same arrangements that have proven feasible in joint hear-
162 Manual for Complex Litigation, Second § 31.31 (1986).
163 A joint trial clearly cannot occur absent agreement of the judges on numerous matters,
such as the order in which issues should be tried. In the Brooklyn Navy Yard litigation, for
example, the judges decided not to conduct a joint trial, in part because they disagreed about
how the cases should be tried-Justice Freedman favored a reverse-bifurcation procedure,
whereas Judge Weinstein preferred to try all issues at once. The judges must also agree how to
structure the plaintiff class. In the Hyatt Skywalk cases, the judges could not agree on this
point. Similarly, Judges Holland and Shortell disagreed about whether class certification was
in order in the Exxon-Valdez litigation.
164 See Interview with Timothy D. O'Leary, supra note 94 (Hyatt Skywalk litigation);
Interview with Peter T. Fay, supra note 100 (Florida Everglades litigation); Interview with
Jack B. Weinstein, supra note 75 (Brooklyn Navy Yard litigation). Most judges agree that
although a joint trial may be appropriate on the issue of liability, it would not be feasible on the
issue of damages because of the individual nature of plaintiffs' damages and the difficulty of
determining and allocating damage awards when two juries are involved.
In the Brooklyn Navy Yard cases, Judge Weinstein and Justice Freedman planned to
preside over a joint trial. In the pretrial phases, the state and federal judges closely
coordinated their cases-adopting similar case management plans, placing double-filed cases
on parallel tracks, providing for common depositions, and faxing orders to each other to
maintain consistency. (Judge Sifton was in charge of the federal cases before transferring them
to Judge Weinstein. See supra text accompanying note 68.) At the trial phase, however, the
state and federal cases proceeded independently, resulting in repeated adjudication of the same
issues and a bottleneck in both the state and federal systems. To ameliorate this situation,
Judge Weinstein proposed a consolidated state-federal trial of cases involving exposure at the
Brooklyn Navy Yard, and Justice Freedman concurred. They presided over joint hearings and
issued common rulings, and set the stage for a joint trial, with two separate juries, to be held in
September 1990. Interview with Jack B. Weinstein, supra note 75; In re Joint E. & S. Dists.
Asbestos Litig., 737 F. Supp. 735, 747 (E.D.N.Y., S.D.N.Y. & N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990). The
judges ultimately decided not to conduct a joint trial, both because a large number of
defendants had settled (rendering a joint trial unnecessary) and because the judges came to
believe that practical problems would render a joint trial unworkable. Interview with Jack B.
Weinstein, supra note 75; Interview with Helen E. Freedman, supra note 75.
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ings"' might work in a joint trial as well. Judge Fay, who handled the
federal cases in the Florida Everglades litigation, believes a joint trial could
be relatively straightforward and easy to conduct:
[W]e had decided that there was no reason why the two of us couldn't
sit on a bench, [e]ven to the point where one of us might preside in the
morning and the other would preside in the afternoon. ... [W]e
would have a jury of six people sitting as a federal jury and a jury of
six people sitting as a state jury.
... I'm sure if we had had the trial we wouldn't have had any
problems ... .166
Although other judges may not share Judge Fay's optimism, several nev-
ertheless look favorably on the possibility of a state-federal trial. One
remarks that it would be "fascinating" and would "require a great deal of
ingenuity."'1 67 (Judges Fay and DuVal developed a system of "signals" they
could use to communicate whether they were inclined to sustain or overrule
an objection.) Another notes that attorneys have also reacted favorably to
the idea of a joint trial, 68 and are intrigued by its novelty and interested in
at least attempting to participate in one. Indeed, in the Hyatt Skywalk litiga-
tion, five attorneys representing state and federal plaintiffs filed a motion in
the state and federal courts requesting a joint trial.' 69
Some parties might fear that their claims will receive short shrift if tried
jointly with claims in another court system. Judge Fay, for one, insists that
such a concern is unfounded:
I was their federal judge and they were going to have a federal trial.
We weren't going to eliminate anything.
[T]here was no reason that all these litigants wouldn't have all
their rights.... [The federal litigants] would have a trial in federal
court. [The state litigants] would have a trial in state court. It was
just that we were going to do it all at once.' 70
165 See supra text accompanying notes 136-61.
166 Interview with Peter T. Fay, supra note 100.
167 Interview with Carl B. Rubin, supra note 72.
168 Interview with Peter T. Fay, supra note 100.
169 See Mary K. Hopkins, Kenneth E. Nelson, James R. Pietz & Phyllis Raccuglia, A Case
Study in Mass Disaster Litigation, 52 U.M.K.C. L. Rev. 151, 170 (1984). Their motion was
denied by the federal court and not considered by the state court. Id.
170 Interview with Peter T. Fay, supra note 100.
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Assuming that joint trials are indeed feasible, they likely would encounter
problems. The potential logistical and practical complications, for example,
labor disputes arising from the assignment of court personnel, are manifold
but stem mostly from the need for separate juries in the state and federal
cases. 171 Most of the judges who have contemplated joint trials envision two
juries in the courtroom-one for the state cases and one for the federal cases.
Judge Fay notes that the attorneys could stipulate that the same people may
serve as both the state and federal jury,17 2 but the general view is that two
separate juries are necessary. When conflicts between state and federal rules
arise, all parties must be guaranteed the protection of the system in which
their case is heard. The state rules may permit certain testimony that the
federal rules do not. The use of two separate juries would allow the federal
court to excuse the federal jury during such testimony. Having two juries
ensures that the state and federal judges each retain control over their cases
by allowing them to pursue different paths-through different instructions
or admonitions, for example. With a single jury, one judge might have to
defer to another's rulings or face unresolvable conflicts. In addition,
although a federal jury must be unanimous to return a verdict, 173 many
states do not require unanimity. 74
A "two jury" approach creates complications of its own, however. Some
are purely logistical matters-two juries may place a strain on the limited
accommodations of a courtroom, and one juror's illness will cause delays in
both jurisdictions. Numerous other problems stem from differences between
state and federal law. State and federal jury selection procedures are often
"worlds apart." 175 As a result, it could take much longer for one court to
select a jury than for the other, which would delay the trial in the faster
court. Similarly, states may differ with the federal system as to the availabil-
ity of interlocutory appeals during trial. 176 Conflicts between state and fed-
171 Thus, a number of judges point out that a joint bench trial is far more feasible than a
joint jury trial. See, e.g., Interview with H. Russel Holland, supra note 74 (noting that
problems involved in a joint trial would be "even worse [in] a jury trial"). However, in
multiparty litigation, some litigants will almost invariably invoke the right to a jury.
172 Interview with Peter T. Fay, supra note 100.
173 Fed. R. Civ. P. 48.
174 See, e.g., La. Const. art. I, § 17; Or. Const. art. I, § 11.
175 Letter from James T. Healey, State Trial Referee, for the Connecticut Superior Court, to
Nancy E. Weiss, Federal Judicial Center (July 23, 1991) (on file with the Federal Judicial
Center, Washington, D.C.) (discussing possible procedures and problems involved in a joint
state-federal trial in the L'Ambiance Plaza litigation).
176 Although interlocutory appeals may prove beneficial when a ruling on a state issue is
necessary, the delay caused by such constant interruptions may further complicate joint
proceedings.
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eral rules of evidence may present the greatest difficulty. 177 Although one
jury may be sent out of the courtroom so that evidence can be introduced
before the other jury, this process can cause confusion and delay. Further,
the process of presenting different evidence to separate juries will not be
uncontroversial. Even if one jury is dismissed while certain evidence is
presented, the circumstances surrounding the jury's excusal may create an
impression that influences that jury. This may result in additional appeals
that frustrate the goal of greater judicial economy.
These problems may not be insoluble. Both Judges Fay and Weinstein,
for example, are confident that removing one jury from a courtroom while
evidence is presented to the other could work relatively smoothly. 17 More-
over, Judge Weinstein believes that such action will generally not be neces-
sary because the federal and state rules grant judges a substantial measure of
discretion.179 Justice Freedman agrees that a joint trial could work, but
emphasizes that, as a general matter, such efforts would work best for short
trials.'80 She came to believe that a joint trial would have been extremely
difficult in the Brooklyn Navy Yard cases due to the number of parties
involved, the differences in state and federal procedures, and the problems of
managing the two juries."8'
The use of two juries also presents the risk of inconsistent verdicts. This
particularly concerned Judge Wright, who consequently opposed conducting
a joint trial in the Hyatt Skywalk litigation. 82 Inconsistent verdicts reduce
public confidence in the jury system by dispelling the notion that there is a
single proper resolution to all issues that would be arrived at by any jury
hearing a particular matter, In addition, such verdicts would be regarded as
unjust by the parties adversely affected.
Arguably, this is primarily a problem of appearances. As noted above, the
state and federal juries may be exposed to different evidence, follow different
procedures, and apply different rules of law. In such a situation, divergent
verdicts may be easily justified. Even if the state and federal juries are
exposed to the same evidence under the same or similar rules of law, how-
ever, different verdicts might still emerge. In a mock trial of ten cases con-
177 For example, federal rules are generally much more liberal than state rules with respect
to the admissibility of summaries of depositions and documents.
178 Interview with Peter T. Fay, supra note 100; Interview with Jack B. Weinstein, supra
note 75.
179 Interview with Jack B. Weinstein, supra note 75.
180 Interview with Helen E. Freedman, supra note 75.
181 Id.
182 "[T]he thing that I feared [most] was [the juries] would come back with inconsistent
verdicts [which would be a] disaster." Interview with Scott 0. Wright, Senior Judge, United
States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, in Kansas City, Mo. (July 19, 1991)
(on file with the Federal Judicial Center, Washington, D.C.).
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ducted by Judge Lambros to facilitate the settlement of asbestos claims, two
separate jury panels heard arguments simultaneously, but deliberated inde-
pendently. One of the juries found none of the defendants liable, while the
other found for the plaintiffs in six of the cases, holding almost all of the
defendants liable for several million dollars in damages.1"3 This problem,
however, is not unique to joint federal-state trials. Absent complete consoli-
dation, similarly situated parties in any mass litigation may receive different
treatment. It is already the case that separate trials on virtually identical
issues and evidence produce disparate results.184 The problem is more visi-
ble, but not otherwise different, when the inconsistency occurs in a single
trial.
Until joint trials are attempted, it is impossible to say whether they are
viable and, if so, desirable. 8 ' Even if they are regarded as unworkable, it
does not follow that state-federal coordination cannot occur in the trial
phase of litigation. In the Beverly Hills Supper Club litigation, for example,
because of the large number of defendants, the state and federal judges
divided the litigation into groups of cases comprising different types of
defendants.186 The first three groups were tried in federal court and the
fourth in state court."8 7 Several defendants in the federal case sought a writ
183 See Rich Arthurs, Summary Trial Fails to Prompt Tort Settlement, Legal Times, Nov.
19, 1984, at 1, 7.
184 See supra note 14.
185 Joint trials with two juries have been conducted intrasystem, in both the state and
federal systems, albeit usually in criminal cases. Such trials have been upheld against various
challenges. See, e.g., United States v. Rimar, 558 F.2d 1271, 1273 (6th Cir.) (simultaneous
prosecutions before two juries did not create atmosphere so confusing as to deprive defendants
of a fair trial), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977), and cert. denied 435 U.S. 922 (1978); United
States v. Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158, 1168-70 (9th Cir. 1972) (two-jury trial allowable under
federal courts' authority to fashion new procedures that facilitate proper fact-finding), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1127 (1973); People v. Brooks, 285 N.W.2d 307, 308-09 (Mich. Ct. App.
1979) (dual jury did not deny defendant a fair trial despite "'traffic jams' in the courtroom,"
jurors sitting outside the juror box, and other logistical problems). One federal court
empaneled two juries for a civil trial involving related complex, multiparty cases governed by
conflicting California and Colorado law, Martin v. Bell Helicopter Co., 85 F.R.D. 654, 656 (D.
Colo. 1980), but the cases settled prior to trial. See also Alex A. Gaynes, Two Juries/One
Trial: Panacea of Judicial Economy or Personification of Murphy's Law?, 5 Am. J. Trial
Advoc. 285, 288-91 (1981) (discussing costs and benefits of a two-jury federal criminal trial as
illustrated by United States v. Hanigan, No. CR-79-206-TUC-RMB (D. Ariz.)).
186 Interview with Carl B. Rubin, supra note 72.
187 The possibility of joint trials was not raised at the time; rather, the judges arranged to
preside independently over the separate pieces of litigation. Judge Rubin recalls proceeding
first in federal court because, among other things, the federal jury is selected from a larger
geographical area-he did not want to place the defendants at a disadvantage before a local
jury well-informed about and possibly affected by the tragedy. Interview with Carl B. Rubin,
supra note 72.
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of mandamus ordering their cases postponed until the state cases were
decided. In denying the writ, the Sixth Circuit noted that the state and fed-
eral judges seemed
sensitive to the issues of federalism and considerations of comity
which are presented in this case. They have held hearings jointly on
some pre-trial motions and are cooperating in establishing discovery
and trial schedules.... The federal and the state judges appear to be
coordinating their activities so as to avoid conffict between the two
judicial systems."'
F. Conclusion: The Benefits of Coordination
Judges attempted intersystem coordination because they believed it would
promote economy, efficiency, and consistency.189 The foregoing discussion
indicates that intersystem coordination has proven effective in accomplishing
these goals.
Beyond doubt, coordination achieved major gains in efficiency and econ-
omy. Significant sharing of human and material resources took place in
most of the cases studied,190 reducing litigation costs, delay, and judicial
time and effort.1 ' Judges also benefitted from each other's expertise, ideas,
information, and techniques.' 9 2 In some cases, the benefits were extraordi-
nary. Federal-state coordination led directly to a global settlement of the
188 Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 588 F.2d 543, 544 (6th
Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 443 U.S. 913 (1979).
189 See supra text accompanying notes 72-77.
190 State judges generally have fewer resources at their disposal. In addition to having a
larger support staff, federal judges can appoint magistrates to handle aspects of their cases and
have greater access to special masters to handle discovery and settlement. They also have
greater access to computers and other support facilities. Furthermore, most federal judges,
though often overworked themselves, consider their dockets more flexible than those of their
state counterparts. For these reasons, in many of the cases, the federal court contributed
greater time and resources to the litigation. According to Judge Rubin, "[s]tate [c]ourt judges
... are terribly overworked. They are overworked, they are underpaid, they are understaffed,
and I really had far more time and personnel [with which to manage the litigation]."
Interview with Carl B. Rubin, supra note 72.
191 Some judges say these cooperative ventures not only prevented duplication but also
quickened their pace. Justice Freedman reports that she and Judge Weinstein were able to
issue many more rulings than usual from the bench. Interview with Helen E. Freedman, supra
note 75.
192 In addition, when judges become acquainted, so do their staffs. One result, says Judge
Lambros, is that staffs can "avoid coniicts in scheduling and other matters between the state
and federal court." Interview with Thomas D. Lambros, supra note 75.
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L'Ambiance Plaza litigation.193 In other cases, the process of judges sharing
information, conferring about legal matters, and ruling jointly helped pre-
vent grossly disparate outcomes in the state and federal cases.
Intersystem coordination is a proven method of alleviating the burdens
mass litigation imposes on the litigants and the judicial system. The judges
we interviewed uniformly believe that collaboration with their state or fed-
eral counterpart proved worthwhile. Many judges expressed a vision of the
courts as a unified system and a "national resource," and thus regarded
intersystem coordination as a natural process in the effort to improve the
administration of justice.19 4
IV. EFFECTIVE COORDINATION: AN OVERVIEW
This Section discusses a wide range of issues relevant to the achievement
of effective intersystem coordination: how judges might initiate and maintain
contact with one another; the necessity of establishing a strong working rela-
tionship; the role attorneys can play; the kinds of situations most conducive
to coordination; and the federalism concerns implicated by state-federal
coordination.
A. Initiation of Contact
L Timing
Coordination obviously cannot take place until a judge contacts his or her
counterpart in the other judicial system. Some judges prefer not to initiate
contact until they have systems in place and can offer tangible resources to
the other court. For example, in the MGM litigation, Judge Bechtle did not
approach Judge Thompson until the federal court had developed a scheme
for handling the cases. According to Judge Bechtle, "I felt that until I really
had something to offer to [Judge Thompson], I would not be doing much
other than a courtesy call, which might have been misunderstood.""'  The
majority of judges interviewed, however, preferred early contact so that the
193 Judge Meadow believes that, absent a joint state-federal mediation structure, the
L'Ambiance Plaza settlement process would have "blown apart." Interview with Frank S.
Meadow, supra note 113.
194 See, e.g., Interview with Peter T. Fay, supra note 100; Interview with Jack B. Weinstein,
supra note 75. See generally, William H. Rehnquist, Welcoming Remarks: Conference on
State-Federal Judicial Relationships, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1657 (1992) (viewing state and federal
courts as one resource which should be used wisely and efficiently so as to reduce the present
caseload crisis).
195 Interview with Louis C. Bechtle, supra note 107.
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state and federal judges could coordinate their schedules, consider joint dis-
covery, and begin thinking about greater cooperation.
196
As a general rule, contact at the earliest possible time is desirable.197
Absent such contact, it is impossible to know when and what coordination
can take place. Moreover, the most extensive cooperation has been achieved
primarily during discovery and other early stages of litigation.
2. How and Who
Most judges initiate contact through a simple telephone call that often
leads to a meeting-generally over lunch-to discuss the litigation. All of
the judges interviewed agree that the initial meetings should be informal.19
The judges are forging an unusual working relationship, and it is critical that
they become comfortable with one another.
Federal judges have usually initiated the contact. Some federal judges
believe they are obligated to do so because state judges may be intimidated
by their federal counterparts.19 9 The federal judge can facilitate effective
coordination if he or she puts the state judge "at [his or her] ease that the
federal courts are not going to [run] roughshod over the whole thing."2 °° In
this regard it can be useful for the federal judge to make the first contact.
That is not to say that federal judges must initiate contact. In the Brooklyn
196 Two to three weeks after receiving the Sioux City cases, Judge Conlon contacted Judge
O'Connell to "open lines of communication" concerning coordination of their proceedings.
Interview with Suzanne B. Conlon, Judge, United States District Court Judge, Northern
District of Illinois (May 8, 1991) (on file with the Federal Judicial Center, Washington, D.C.).
Judge Rubin contacted Judge Diskin as soon as he learned that there was a Beverly Hills case
filed in state court that paralleled those in his court. Interview with Carl B. Rubin, supra note
72. Judge Holland even stayed discovery in the Exxon-Valdez litigation so that he could
contact Judge Shortell and develop a state-federal pretrial and discovery scheme.
197 As Professor Frances McGovern observes, "the sooner the cooperative effort begins in
the litigation, the larger the role of that cooperation. Courts that have taken control of a case
before the interests of attorneys, judges, and others have become vested, have much more
opportunity to fashion an agreeable approach." Francis E. McGovern, Conference Paper
presented at National Conference on Emerging ADR Issues in State and Federal Courts (April
19, 1991) (on file with the Federal Judicial Center, Washington, D.C.). This certainly was true
for Judges Zampano and Meadow, who attribute their success with the L'Ambiance Plaza
litigation to early intervention. See supra text accompanying note 117.
198 Judge Beethle recalls first speaking with Judge Thompson, and then walking to the
Nevada state court to meet him. Interview with Louis C. Bechtle, supra note 107. Judge
Thompson responded by inviting the federal judge, along with the federal magistrate involved
in the litigation, to his home for dinner where the three discussed the case at length. Interview
with J. Charles Thompson, supra note 73.
199 Interview with Louis C. Bechtle, supra note 107. Judge Rubin warns against federal
judges contributing to this sense of intimidation by trying to dominate the process.
200 Interview with Carl B. Rubin, supra note 72.
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Navy Yard litigation, Justice Freedman first telephoned Judge Sifton to dis-
cuss whether the two court systems could work together.
In several of the cases we studied, the judges knew each other well, which
facilitated their working relationship." 1 It would, however, be a mistake to
infer that effective coordination requires a previous relationship. In many of
the cases we studied, the judges did not know each other previously.2" 2
Judges may be reluctant to contact another member of the judiciary whom
they do not know to discuss their cases. Experience teaches that overcoming
that reluctance is worthwhile.
It should be emphasized that the initial meeting does not commit the
judges to extensive coordination.20 3 Moreover, an exchange of ideas may
later bear fruit even if it is originally determined that coordination is not
feasible. In the Technical Equities litigation, the state and federal judges
originally did not arrive at a method of coordinating their proceedings.
However, later in the litigation they agreed to appoint common special mas-
ters to give consistent treatment to the state and federal cases.
. Maintaining Contact
The judges' initial conversations tend to focus on general perspectives of
the litigation, case management strategies, and areas appropriate for state-
federal cooperation. As the cases progress, the judges need to maintain con-
tact on a range of matters including scheduling, simply keeping abreast of
cases in the other system, preparing for joint hearings, making joint rulings,
or consulting on matters of procedure or substantive law.
To a certain extent, the amount and frequency of contact is a matter of
individual preference, although much of it is tied to the stage the litigation is
in, the amount of state-federal coordination, and other particulars of the
case. For the majority of judges, monthly or bi-monthly contact sufficed.
According to Judge Rubin, who engaged in extensive coordination with
Judge Diskin, constant communication is "far less necessary than you might
201 Judge Lambros had met Judge McMonagle at bar association meetings. Judge Eginton
states that "[Judge Healey] was an old friend.... so I knew... [he] would take the same
approach that I took [in managing the litigation]." Interview with Warren W. Eginton, supra
note 143. Judge Fay had tried cases in Judge DuVal's court and developed a friendship with
him. Interview with Peter T. Fay, supra note 100.
202 Judge Rubin recalls telephoning Judge Diskin and introducing himself. Interview with
Carl B. Rubin, supra note 72. Judge Diskin was pleased by the approach, and the judges got
together at the state courthouse to plan coordination which culminated in a fruitful
partnership. Id. Similarly, Judges Holland and Shortell were not previously acquainted, yet
were receptive to the idea of working together.
203 Judge Fay recalls that during the first conversations, he and Judge DuVal merely
"explor[ed] the thought" of coordination. Interview with Peter T. Fay, supra note 100.
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think."'2 4 Although he and Judge Diskin held numerous joint hearings,
they generally spoke only once a month.
The methods of communication used also vary from judge to judge and
case to case. Whereas some prefered to use the telephone or hold informal
meetings in chambers, others maintained contact by mailing or faxing docu-
ments such as orders or memoranda to one another.
Whether by phone or fax or in person, ongoing communication can be
critical to effective coordination, as illustrated by the experience of Judges
Conlon and O'Connell. Judge Conlon held monthly status conferences with
the federal litigants. A few days before each conference, she telephoned
Judge O'Connell to discuss the issues likely to arise during the proceedings
and to share "off the cuff" impressions about the cases.20 5 Judge Conlon
notes that these conversations helped her make "better" decisions.20 6 After
the conference, she would send Judge O'Connell the transcript. The state
judge then held his own conferences, often adopting the procedures arranged
in the federal conference. Judge Conlon claims that this arrangement dis-
couraged forum shopping, and helped produce consistency even without
joint hearings and joint rulings.2 07
Maintaining ongoing contact and sharing information yields other benefits
as well. Action taken in one court-such as settlement or dismissal-can
directly affect the tactics of litigants in the other court's cases. Remaining
aware of the course of action in related cases helps avoid surprises. A situa-
tion where a judge is unaware of the action taken by the other judge is,
according to Judge Rubin, something to "be avoided under any circum-
stances.",208 To be first informed of such an action by the lawyers would
"put any judge in a very embarrassing position."2" 9
C. The Working Relationship
Those who have engaged in intersystem coordination tend to agree that
the strength of the personal and working relationship developed between the
judges influences the success of the enterprise more than any other factor.
As Judge Weinstein puts it: "Coordination has nothing to do with proce-
204 Interview with Carl B. Rubin, supra note 72.
205 Interview with Suzanne B. Cordon, supra note 196.
206 Id.
207 Id. In the first phase of the New York asbestos litigation, uniform treatment of all
parties was a primary concern of Justice Freedman and Judge Sifton. Interview with Helen E.
Freedman, supra note 75. They would confer prior to arriving at an opinion or one judge
would adopt the outcome of an issue decided in the other court. Id.
208 Interview with Carl B. Rubin, supra note 72.
209 Id.
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dures; it has to do with personality."21 A number of important dimensions
of this relationship can be highlighted. Successful coordination requires flex-
ibility and willingness to compromise in order to develop arrangements
acceptable to both courts. Judge Zampano explains that an "exchange of
communication, discussion, and camaraderie is very important .... There
can't be egos here."21  His collaborator Judge Meadow agrees, adding that
coordination requires "two judges that are not going to in any way let their
personalities get in the way of their objectives., 212 Judge Bechtle suggests
that state and federal judges trying to develop a supportive relationship need
to take into account "[s]ome degree of informality" as well as "more diplo-
macy and more consideration and more public relations and courtesy.
2 13
Judge Rubin also stresses the need for informality.2 14 A true partnership
cannot emerge unless the judges feel comfortable with one another and let
down barriers.
Coordination also requires mutual respect. Judge Meadow observes that
the respect he and Judge Zampano had for each other made their successful
collaboration possible: "I'm sure that [Judge Zampano] respected what I
said and I certainly respected what he said, so we were.., a good team.
2 15
. The Role of Attorneys
Coordination obviously requires that each judge learn of related cases
pending in the other court system. Attorneys can be helpful in that regard
because they often have related cases pending in both court systems and
generally favor intersystem coordination because it can spare them and their
clients unnecessary costs and duplication of effort.2 16 Judge Lambros main-
tains that attorneys are "the best source of information as to the pendency of
a state or federal related case" and proposes a rule requiring them to notify
210 Interview with Jack B. Weinstein, supra note 75.
211 Interview with Robert C. Zampano, supra note 106.
212 Interview with Frank S. Meadow, supra note 113.
213 Interview with Louis C. Bechtle, supra note 107.
214 Judge Rubin recalls that at first he and Judge Diskin were tentative about coordination,
but "as time went on... we got to be quite friendly and stopped being Judge Diskin and Judge
Rubin and became John and Carl. And that helped." Interview with Carl B. Rubin, supra
note 72.
215 Interview with Frank S. Meadow, supra note 113.
216 Judge Shortell reports that there was "never any reluctance on the part of the parties" to
bring together the judges handling the Exxon-Valdez litigation. Interview with Brian C.
Shortell, supra note 158. Similarly, Judge Fay recalls that, in the Florida Everglades litigation,
"it was... clear that there was going to be a lot of duplicated effort and cost and the lawyers
were obviously willing to do anything they could to streamline it." Interview with Peter T.
Fay, supra note 100.
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the court of such cases.2 17 In the cases we studied, however, the attorneys
notified the court on their own.218
The role of attorneys in state-federal coordination extends beyond getting
it started. Their active participation is vital at every stage of coordination.
Attorneys may be more knowledgeable than the court about numerous mat-
ters relevant to coordination, such as relationships among counsel, parties'
different priorities and stages of preparation, or ongoing settlement talks.
Furthermore, because the judiciary has limited experience with intersystem
coordination, attorneys are a welcome source of ideas. One commentator
observes the tendency to "underestimate the power of counsel in fashioning
procedural decisions and the role of counsel as a natural constituency for
both federal and state judges." 219
Coordination requires not only that attorneys communicate with the
court, but also cooperate with one another.22 This is partly because "[a] bar
that is collegial and cooperative will foster joint activity by judges,, 221 but
also because the actual state-federal arrangements often involve committees
of attorneys taking the lead in achieving intersystem coordination.
Although attorneys may decide to work together without court supervi-
sion, judges need not rely on such initiative-they may appoint a limited
number of attorneys to supervise state-federal efforts. In the New York
asbestos cases, the first step toward coordination was Justice Freedman's
appointment of the same liaison counsel to handle the state cases as Judge
Sifton had already appointed for the federal cases.222 Similarly, in the Flor-
ida Everglades litigation, Judge Fay initially appointed a "plaintiffs' commit-
tee" to coordinate discovery in the federal court and Judge DuVal later
appointed the same attorneys as lead counsel in the state cases. In the Hyatt
217 Interview with Thomas D. Lambros, supra note 75.
218 Justice Freedman recalls that in the Brooklyn Navy Yard litigation the attorneys in both
the state and federal cases brought her a copy of Judge Sifton's asbestos litigation case
management plan. Interview with Helen E. Freedman, supra note 75. Judge Fay remembers
that within weeks of the filing in his court of the Florida Everglades cases, attorneys informed
him of related cases in state court. nterview with Peter T. Fay, supra note 100. Likewise, in
the Sioux City litigation, attorneys informed Judge Conlon that similar cases were filed in
other courts. Interview with Suzanne B. Conlon, supra note 196.
219 McGovern, supra note 197, at 9.
220 Successful coordination in the New York asbestos cases, for example, was largely a
function of collegiality among counsel. Justice Freedman notes that the "[l]awyers [had] done
depositions upon depositions for years together, so [they] all knew each [other]" even before
she and Judge Sifton began working together. Interview with Helen E. Freedman, supra note
75.
221 McGovern, supra note 197, at 9.
222 See Memorandum from Sol Wachtler, Chief Judge New York Court of Appeals,
Federal-State Coordination of Asbestos Litigation in New York City (May 1, 1991) (on file
with the Federal Judicial Center, Washington, D.C.).
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Skywalk cases, the attorneys with cases in the state court elected a liaison
committee to handle discovery in the state cases.223 Judges Wright and
O'Leary subsequently appointed a "Joint State-Federal Liaison Committee"
to coordinate pretrial activities for the state and federal cases. The joint
committee consisted of members of the state committee and several others
independently appointed by Judge Wright.224 Both judges report that this
arrangement worked well.225
Harmonious interaction becomes difficult if many attorneys are involved.
Early in the Beverly Hills Supper Club litigation, Judge Rubin appointed
seven attorneys to serve as lead counsel. He later informed Judge Diskin of
the appointment, and the state judge similarly appointed seven attorneys.
The fourteen attorneys subsequently formed a joint state-federal steering
committee. In retrospect, Judge Rubin believes the committee was too large.
"[P]redictably, there was... an internal fight among the lawyers, and one
group emerged in control.., and they proceeded to litigate the case[s] there-
after." 226 He believes that a small state-federal lead counsel committee
would make dual system cooperation "immensely easier.,
227
Judge Rubin draws a second lesson from this experience: the value of con-
sultation between state and federal judges before lead counsel is appointed
for either case. He believes the problem of the oversized joint committee
would have been avoided had he discussed the matter with Judge Diskin at
the beginning; the two would have agreed on a smaller number of attorneys
to handle the litigation.228 Judges Holland and Shortell put this theory into
practice, jointly reviewing resumes in order to select lead and liaison counsel
to manage the Exxon-Valdez pretrial proceedings for both courts. The com-
mon committee structure has worked well thus far.2 29
Yet, cooperation among attorneys has limits. In the Hyatt Skywalk litiga-
tion, the attorneys in federal court preferred a class action while the attor-
neys in the state cases wanted to handle their cases individually,23 ° and
considerable tension resulted. In general, lawyers favor state-federal coordi-
223 See Wright & Colussi, supra note 58, at 164.
224 Further, the judges requested that this committee develop a "comprehensive plan for
discovery . . . [and] prepare briefs on common issues in pre-trial discovery matters."
Memorandum and Order at 4, In re Federal Skywalk Cases (No. 81-0593-CV-W-3) (W.D. Mo.
Sept. 2, 1981) (establishing Joint State-Federal Liaison Committee and its obligations).
m Interview with Scott 0. Wright, supra note 182; Interview with Timothy O'Leary, supra
note 94.
226 Interview with Carl B. Rubin, supra note 72.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Interview with H. Russel Holland, supra note 74.
230 The state plaintiffs tended to have more serious injuries than their federal counterparts
and thought they were better off without class certification, whereas federal plaintiffs were
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nation of discovery and settlement, but are sometimes reluctant to proceed
further because they have consciously chosen to proceed in one forum, and
do not want to see the significance of that decision diminished. Courts
should be sensitive to their interests and seek the lawyers' approval (not
merely their grudging acceptance) of such intersystem coordination as seems
desirable. This may involve assuring counsel that even when matters are
jointly briefed, argued, and even decided, the judge in whose court the case is
brought will not abdicate his or her responsibility to give the matter
independent consideration.
E. Situations Most Conducive to Effective Coordination
Most coordination has occurred in litigation arising out of a single, dis-
crete event. Although such cases are typically the best candidates for coor-
dination, they are not the only ones. Indeed, in both the Ohio and New
York asbestos cases, the litigation ranged far beyond a single event. When-
ever there are closely related cases in the state and federal courts, intersys-
tem coordination is a possibility worth exploring. There are, however,
certain circumstances under which coordination has proven most feasible.
L Proximity
Not surprisingly, judges have found that coordination works best when
the state and federal courts are in close proximity.23' In an effort to coordi-
nate all asbestos-related cases filed in the New York federal courts, Judge
Weinstein contacted the chief judges of all the federal districts. The Eastern
and Southern Districts, each with courts located in New York City,
arranged to consolidate their cases before one judge, whereas coordination
was not achieved with the Western and Northern Districts. Judge Weinstein
believes that the geographical distance between the New York City judges
and the upstate judges prevented the "meeting of the minds" that was
achieved by the courts located in New York City alone.232 The effect of
distance is also observable in the Sioux City cases. Judges Conlon and
O'Connell, both located in Chicago, maintained frequent contact and
primarily concerned about the distribution of punitive damages and thus favored a class
action. Interview with Timothy D. O'Leary, supra note 94.
231 This is not to say, however, that more extensive coordination with a distant court can
never be achieved. In the Chicago air crash litigation, the federal cases were consolidated
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 and assigned to judges in Chicago, whereas a large cluster of
cases was filed in a California state court. See In re Airline Disaster Litig. Report, 127 F.R.D.
405, 406 (N.D. Ill. 1988). The federal and state courts coordinated discovery to some extent,
although the cooperation achieved in this case was not nearly so great as that achieved in cases
where the state and federal courts were in greater proximity.
232 Interview with Jack B. Weinstein, supra note 75.
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engaged in extensive coordination. Although Judge Conlon also faxed copies
of her orders to a Missouri state judge handling related cases, no further
coordination was achieved with this judge.
The JPML recognizes the relevance of geographical proximity to state-
federal cooperation. In several cases, it has cited potential intersystem coor-
dination as a reason for transferring cases to a particular district. In the
Sioux City cases, for example, the JPML observed that "numerous related
actions are pending in Illinois state court" and correctly predicted that
"transfer to the Northern District of Illinois could facilitate coordination
among the federal and Illinois state court actions." '233 In another litigation,
the JPML, in transferring several federal cases to the Eastern District of
New York, noted that "related litigation is pending in the New York state
courts, thus enhancing the opportunity for state/federal coordination." '234
2. Intrasystem Aggregation
The possibility of intersystem coordination is enhanced when the cases
within each system are aggregated. When one judge is in charge of all the
cases in a system, that judge can structure the litigation and ensure uniform
treatment of the cases. This, in turn, makes it possible to develop a coherent
plan for coordinating related cases with another court. The collaborative
process is obviously easier when there are fewer judges involved. Such
things as coordinated scheduling, a common case management plan, and
joint hearings require extensive effort and communication between two
judges and become far more difficult as the number of judges increases.
Moreover, when only a few judges manage all of the related cases, these
judges have access to all of the parties and thus an opportunity to encourage
a global settlement, which would be far less likely if the cases were scattered
among many courts. In all of the cases studied, some form of aggregation
was achieved within both the state and federal systems.
The JPML recognizes that intrasystem aggregation greatly facilitates
intersystem coordination. When transferring 26,000 asbestos cases to the
233 In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, on July 19, 1969, 128 F.R.D. 131, 132-33
(J.P.M.L. 1989).
234 In re Ambassador Group Inc. Litig., Docket No. 778, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17024, at
*3 (J.P.M.L. October 12, 1988) (transfer order). See also In re Oil Spill By "Amoco Cadiz,"
471 F. Supp. 473, 478-79 (J.P.M.L. 1979) (noting related actions pending in Illinois state
court and stating that the "possibility of promoting this state/federal coordination is another
factor favoring the selection of the Northern District of Illinois as the transferee forum"); In re
Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades on December 29, 1972, 360 F. Supp. 1394, 1395-96
(J.P.M.L. 1973) (noting state-federal coordination that had already taken place and finding
that "[tiransfer of all actions to the Southern District of Florida, therefore, will take advantage
of this state-federal accommodation ... and will greatly enhance the expeditious processing of
all actions arising out of the crash").
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Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the JPML noted that "transfer will...
have the salutary effect of creating one federal court with which [state] pro-
ceedings can be coordinated .... Indeed, state court judges have communi-
cated to the Panel that coordination among state courts and a single
transferee court for the federal actions is an objective worthy of pursuit." '235
3. A Supportive Legal Community
Although the actual state-federal coordination usually involves the work
of a few individual judges, the appropriate judicial environment throughout
a jurisdiction can facilitate coordination. For example, Judge Shortell
describes the Alaska court systems as "more relaxed" than those in larger
jurisdictions such that "[t]here is not so much formality" and certainly no
"friction" between the state and federal courts.23 6 Because of this, he says,
"there is no impediment ... even to [judges] who don't know each other,
getting together and talking [about their cases]." '2 37 Similarly, Judge
Zampano believes that his coordination with Judge Meadow was aided by
the nature of Connecticut's judicial community in which the courts "have
comity beyond the everyday business.
238
The larger legal community made a similar contribution to the coordina-
tion achieved in the New York asbestos litigation. After Justice Freedman
contacted Judge Sifton about the possibility of coordination, the two judges
met with Judge Weinstein, then Chief Judge of the Eastern District of New
York, and the Hon. Xavier C. Riccobono, Administrative Judge of the Civil
Branch of the State Supreme Court of New York County. The four judges
explored ways for the two courts to cooperate. The participation of Judges
235 In re Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig., 771 F. Supp. 415, 421 n.6 (J.P.M.L. 1991). In
affirming an order staying an action pending in California on the grounds of forum non
conveniens, a state appellate court recognized that:
[HIundreds of suits resulting from the fire have been filed in Nevada in federal or state
court and a massive consolidation effort has been ongoing in these courts for over a
year. A huge amount of discovery has already occurred and the documents are stored
in a Las Vegas warehouse, available to inspection by all parties in both state or federal
actions. Additionally, much preliminary pleading and law and motion work has taken
place in Nevada courts. In view of the advanced stage of this consolidated litigation, it
is certainly in the best interests of judicial efficiency to require the plaintiffs to file in
Nevada since the litigation process there is already well underway.
Dendy v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 95, 98-99 (Ct. App. 1982). When the bulk
of litigation is proceeding in one locale, and state and federal judges within that locale are
coordinating their cases, judges from other areas should consider limiting access to their own
fora in order to facilitate the coordination. In the MGM litigation, Judge Bechtle's and Judge
Thompson's coordination encouraged courts of other states to stay their proceedings.
236 Interview with Brian C. Shortell, supra note 158.
237 Id.
238 Interview with Robert C. Zampano, supra note 106.
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Weinstein and Riccobono conveyed an important message: Justice Freed-
man and Judge Sifton knew that their courts endorsed state-federal judicial
coordination.2 39
Because an atmosphere in which state and federal judges feel comfortable
conferring and collaborating with one another can facilitate coordination,
judges (especially chief judges) attracted to the possibility of intersystem
coordination may wish to consider how to foster such an atmosphere.24
F. Federalism Concerns
The potential benefits of intersystem coordination should be clear. There
are, however, potential drawbacks as well, mostly stemming from the fact
that intersystem coordination invites tampering with the traditional jurisdic-
tional boundaries of the state and federal court systems. The United States
Constitution envisions two separate judiciaries. 241 For the country at large,
this division provides varied laboratories in which to test different
approaches. For individual litigants dual judiciaries can offer a choice of
where to pursue or defend against a claim. Judges must be sensitive to the
possibility that state-federal coordination can undermine these interests.
L Shared Power Relationship
Coordination requires judges to make joint decisions involving both case
management and legal interpretation. Certain risks inhere in any joint deci-
sionmaking situation. First, the necessary compromises will, in the percep-
tion of an individual judge, sometimes come at the expense of excellence.
There may be situations--especially on nondispositive matters such as dis-
covery arrangements-where a judge feels that acting consistently with the
other court is more important than issuing what he or she considers to be a
perfect ruling. Judges should exercise care not to compromise too much.
Where the ruling affects the substantive rights of the parties, judges should
generally adopt what they consider to be the proper ruling,242 even if it pro-
duces an inconsistency with the other court.
Another potential problem with any power-sharing arrangement is that
one party may exert too much influence. As a result, the methods and inter-
pretations of the subordinate partner are lost. Put differently, when one
239 Since the Brooklyn Navy Yard litigation, New York state and federal judges have
cooperated in pretrial and settlement efforts for other clusters of cases. See Memorandum,
supra note 222.
240 In addition to those circumstances discussed in this Section, the ability to coordinate
effectively can vary according to the nature of the substantive legal disputes. See, e.g.,
McGovern, supra note 197, at 4.
241 U.S. Const. arts. III, IV.
242 See infra text accompanying notes 251-66 (discussing deference).
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judge takes a dominant role, a fuller range of approaches may be sacri-
ficed. 43 In addition, judges risk diminishing the integrity of their court's
decisionmaking process if they become a rubber stamp for another court. In
several of the cases under study, one judge essentially controlled the litiga-
tion in both systems.2' It was not uncommon for the federal court to play
this role.24 In light of federal courts' greater resources, this tendency is
understandable, but judges should take care that dominance be avoided if
possible. In addition to the risks described, federal courts should be wary of
overstepping their Article III function by making decisions affecting persons
over whom they have no jurisdiction.246
2. Litigant Choice
Perhaps the greatest concern is that intersystem coordination can dimin-
ish the litigants' benefits of their choice of forum. They might have had
good reason for selecting one court system over the other,247 and when
judges work together and influence one another, or mold their rules to con-
form to those of another system, or decide matters jointly, litigants may lose
the advantages of their chosen forum.24
243 The potential for sacrificing one court's practices and views is especially acute because
state and federal judges have different experiences and occupy different institutional positions.
There is the risk, for example, that federal courts will interfere unduly with the development of
state law. See infra text accompanying notes 260-65 (addressing federal court deference on
questions of state law).
244 In some cases, one judge dominated pretrial case management. See discussion of Florida
Everglades litigation, supra p. 1700. In other cases, one judge proceeded to trial whereas the
other judge in effect stayed his or her proceedings. See discussion of MGM Hotel litigation,
supra note 103 and accompanying text.
245 Of course, one factor to be considered is how cases end up in different courts. For
example, in the MGM litigation, most cases were in the federal court under diversity
jurisdiction, with the state cases filed as "savings" cases should something happen to the
federal claims. See Interview with J. Charles Thompson, supra note 73. A federal lead was
perhaps more justifiable in this situation than in the Hyatt Skywalk litigation where the
majority of cases was filed in state court.
246 See In re Allied Signal, Inc., 915 F.2d 190, 191 (6th Cir. 1990) ("Unless Congress has
granted jurisdiction to the courts, Article III limits the ability of district courts to act.").
247 See Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1677, 1678-79 (1990).
Among the considerations that may motivate a forum shopper are the convenience or
expense of litigating in the forum, the inconvenience to one's adversary, the probable or
expected sympathies of a potential jury pool, the nature and availability of appellate
review, judicial calendars and backlogs, local rules, permissibility of fee-splitting
arrangements, and virtually any other interjurisdictional difference.
Id.
248 In addition, when judges work together they may upset the traditional modus operandi
that exists within a court system. For example, attorneys may feel less able to challenge a
ruling or arrangement agreed to by two judges.
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Nevertheless, the judicial system need not be hostage to all party prefer-
ences. For example, defendants in mass litigation sometimes prefer delay
because it can make plaintiffs more willing to settle for a lesser amount. But
the judiciary generally does not consider delay a value worth protecting,249
and if state-federal coordination denies a party desired delay, that can hardly
be considered problematic. Judge Fay goes further in downplaying concern
that intersystem coordination denies litigant choice:
Everyone has to have access to the ourts.... [But i]f they come in,
they are bound by all types of restrictive procedures .... There [are]
a lot of things they can do. There [are] a lot of things they can't do. It
is a question of weighing the rights of the individual, weighing the due
process that everyone is entitled to... and trying to accommodate all
that in an efficient way.
250
Although state-federal coordination may deprive some parties of the bene-
fits of their chosen forum, that price may be worth the gains to the entire
judicial system. Nevertheless, there is a trade-off, and courts should keep
sight of the costs.
The potential problem of state-federal coordination denying litigants full
and independent consideration within their forum is perhaps most acute
where state and federal courts join forces in deciding issues of substantive
law. We now turn our attention to that area.
3. Deference on Substantive Law Issues
The state and federal judicial systems have traditionally applied each
other's law. Federal courts address state law questions in diversity cases and
state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over most federal causes of action.
Not everyone finds this overlap felicitous. Some argue that the expertise and
constitutional independence of federal judges make them far better equipped
than their state counterparts to apply federal law.25' Conversely, some
maintain that federal judges lack the expertise and interest necessary to
249 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 ("These rules... shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action.").
25 Interview with Peter T. Fay, supra note 100.
251 See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two
Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205, 235-38 (1985). Article III of the United
States Constitution confers on federal judges lifetime tenure and prohibits diminution of their
compensation. According to Professor Amar, these privileges insulate federal judges from
political pressures and therefore make them better guardians of individual rights and the
national interest than their state counterparts.
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apply state law effectively.252 Each of these perspectives, of course, has a
counterperspective, e.g., the value of fifty laboratories in which approaches
to federal law can be tested, and the need for a federal forum to protect
nonresidents from local prejudice.
These concerns are especially germane when state and federal judges coor-
dinate their related cases. The most pressing issues are whether federal and
state courts should defer to one another on questions of state law and federal
law respectively. On its face, it would seem that substantive law disputes
provide state and federal courts with an opportunity to benefit from mutual
assistance: the state court can follow the federal court's lead on matters of
federal law and vice versa. In fact, the matter is more complex. Fortu-
nately, courts are not without guidance in addressing these questions
because they arise not only in coordinated state-federal litigation but in other
situations as well.
a. State Court Deference on Questions of Federal Law
The overwhelming majority of state courts to address the question have
held that they are not bound by lower federal court decisions on federal
law.253 One commentator expresses and endorses the prevailing view as
follows:
In cases in which federal law is applied, and the jurisdiction in federal
and state courts is concurrent, the state court must follow the federal
law, and the decisions of the inferior court are, naturally, persuasive
authority on issues as yet unresolved by the Supreme Court. In such
cases, however, the state courts owe no special obedience to the deci-
sions of the particular circuit in which the state is located, or in the
strict sense, to the decisions of the federal inferior courts as a class,
and any error they may make in their interpretation of the federal law
must be corrected by the Supreme Court.254
252 See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D.
231, 237 (1976) (noting that federal courts lack familiarity with the application of state law
and are especially disadvantaged where the contested point is not settled).
253 No one questions that the Supreme Court's decisions on issues of federal law are binding
on all state and federal courts.
254 1B James W. Moore, Jo D. Lucas & Thomas S. Currier, Moore's Federal Practice
0.402[1] at n.40 (2d ed. 1992). See also Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 Yale L.J. 1035, 1053 (1977) (noting
that "[c]learly, state courts are not bound to respect the doctrinal statements of the inferior
federal tribunals insofar as they understand those statements not to be compelled by the
Supreme Court"); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 Harv. L.
Rev. 1128, 1231 n.495 (1986) ("Decisions of lower federal courts on issues of federal law are
not binding precedents for a state court .... "); David L. Shapiro, State Courts and Federal
Declaratory Judgments, 74 Nw. U. L. Rev. 759, 771 (1979) ("[O]nly the Supreme Court sits
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If this view is correct, it would be problematic for a state court, in the course
of coordinating companion cases with a federal court, simply to cede the
interpretation of federal law to the federal court. In doing so, the state court
would appear to be abdicating its responsibility to the litigants before it.255
There is a school of thought, however, that state courts are bound by fed-
eral court decisions on federal law. This argument rests on federal courts'
expertise in federal law and the value of uniformity. In dicta the Ninth Cir-
cuit recently said:
Having chosen to create the lower federal courts, Congress may have
intended that just as state courts have the final word on questions of
state law, the federal courts ought to have the final word on questions
of federal law. The contrary view could lead to considerable friction
between the state and federal courts as well as duplicative
litigation.25 6
The court, therefore, expressed "serious doubts" about the proposition that
"state courts are free to ignore decisions" of the lower federal courts.257
Significantly, the Ninth Circuit's language suggests a false dichotomy
between state courts either being bound by or ignoring lower federal courts'
decisions on federal law. In fact, state courts almost invariably acknowledge
that federal courts' interpretations of federal law warrant respect and consid-
eration. Some have recognized policy reasons for following the federal cir-
cuit court within whose boundaries they reside, while noting that they are
not bound to do so.2" 8 Other state courts have found that federal court deci-
atop the state courts in the national hierarchy."); Note, Authority in State Courts of Lower
Federal Court Decisions on National Law, 48 Colum. L. Rev. 943, 945 (1948) (noting the
refusal of many state courts to follow lower federal court decisions). The two federal circuit
courts to decide this issue agree. United States ex rel Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1075
(7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971); Owsley v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 804, 805 (4th
Cir. 1965). This view derives from the parallel structure of the two systems where federal law
is concerned: the state courts and lower federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction; neither has
appellate power over the other; and the United States Supreme Court has appellate power over
both.
255 See State v. Coleman, 214 A.2d 393, 404 (N.J. 1965) (observing that to blindly follow the
federal courts would be to "abdicat[e] our undoubted responsibility to pass on issues of
constitutionality and justice as we see them"), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 950 (1966).
256 Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 1991).
257 Id.
258 See State v. Goodell, 734 P.2d 10, 11 (Or. App. 1987) ("[The Ninth Circuit's] decision is
controlling on the federal courts in Oregon, and there are practical advantages, which we
cannot ignore, when federal and state courts adopt the same interpretation of federal law."),
review denied, 734 P.2d 1248 (Or. 1987); Pennsylvania v. Negri, 213 A.2d 670, 672 (Pa. 1965)
("If the Pennsylvania courts refuse to abide by [the Third Circuit's] conclusions, then the
individual to whom we deny relief need only to 'walk across the street' to gain a different
result. Such an unfortunate situation would cause disrespect for the law.").
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sions are entitled to special weight, even though they are not binding, when
there is a strongly prevailing view in the federal courts.2"9
This middle path offers a fruitful possibility to federal and state courts
coordinating their companion cases: although the state court should not
automatically follow the federal court's determinations on federal law, it
may accord them great weight, perhaps even a rebuttable presumption of
correctness. This policy of deference would seem especially justified in light
of the value of producing consistent results in related cases. As long as the
deference is not blind, the state court arguably fulfills its responsibility.
b. Federal Court Deference on Questions of State Law
It is well settled that state courts are the highest authority in the interpre-
tation of their own law. Therefore, when a federal court faces a question of
state law, it must follow the interpretation of that state's highest court.2 ° In
cases where the state's highest court has not addressed the issue, the federal
court must predict what the state court would do.26' Whereas decisions of
the state's highest court are binding, federal courts are not bound by lower
state courts' interpretation of state law. 62 Thus, when state and federal
courts coordinate their related cases, it may be problematic for the federal
259 See, e.g., Edwards v. Henry, 293 N.W.2d 756, 759 (Mich. App. 1980) ("[W]here there
exists no split of authority in the Federal courts concerning the interpretation of a Federal
statute, state courts should be very cautious in differing with the prevailing view in that system
... ."); Wimberly v. Labor and Indus. Relations Comm'n, 688 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. 1985) (en
banc), aff'd, 479 U.S. 511 (1987).
[The lower court] stated that the courts of this state, when confronted with the task of
interpreting a federal statute, are bound to follow the decisions of lower federal courts
construing the statute in question.... [Tihis court has never subscribed to such a
notion. On the contrary, we have adhered to the view that the courts of this state are
bound to follow only our Supreme Court's decisions interpreting the federal
Constitution and federal statutes....
... [But] in some circumstances it may be appropriate for a state court to defer to
long established and widely accepted federal court interpretations of federal statutes.
Id. at 347-48. See also Blankenship v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 742 P.2d 680, 681-82 (Or. App.
1987), review denied, 749 P.2d 136 (Or. 1988).
There is no controlling United States or Oregon Supreme Court decision on the ques-
tion. That being so, it is clearly within the authority of this court to adopt either posi-
tion on the federal question, and we are not bound by what the majority of federal (or
state) courts have held. [But] it is also clear that, in deciding what the federal law is, the
fact that a decided preponderance of federal courts have taken one view rather than the
other is a relevant consideration in itself, along with but independently of the persua-
siveness of the reasoning which supports the two views.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
260 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
261 See, e.g., In re Kirkland, 915 F.2d 1236, 1239 (9th Cir. 1990).
262 Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967).
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court simply to adopt the state court's rulings on state law.26 3 If federal
litigants argue that the state's highest court would probably rule otherwise,
they may be entitled to have the argument considered by the federal court.
Once again, though, the choice is not between blindly following a court's
interpretation and ignoring it. Indeed, it is settled doctrine that the decisions
of lower state courts on matters of state law, although not binding on federal
courts, carry significant weight. 2" In the context of companion state-federal
cases, the value of consistency arguably justifies the federal court giving the
state court's interpretation of state law even more weight than it otherwise
might-albeit still making sure that it regards the state court's interpretation
as reasonable. This also ensures that the federal court does not excessively
interfere with the development of state law.265
In this discussion, we do not purport to resolve the issues raised. Rather,
we emphasize that state and federal courts coordinating their cases must be
aware of and sensitive to these issues. We have suggested possible ways of
approaching these matters, ways that neither thwart extensive coordination
nor lead courts to take actions that might be construed as an abdication of
their respective responsibilities.266
V. CONCLUSION
The cases we have studied tell stories of how state and federal judges
broke new ground leading to better justice in complex parallel litigation in
the two court systems. These experiences are instructive for judges in other
cases, not so much by disclosing specific techniques or methods (although
those can be helpful), but rather by illustrating what can be done, stimulat-
263 Where the issue is significant, and state law permits, the federal court may stay its
hearings while the disputed question is certified to a higher state court for decision. Lehman
Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 389-91 (1974).
264 See Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. at 465 (noting that federal court must give "proper regard"
to decisions of lower state courts).
265 In the cases studied, the state court judges were careful not to take a back seat on
questions of state law. For example, whereas Judge Bechtle took the lead in the MGM
litigation, Judge Thompson made sure that interpretation of state law was correct. He says
that "I'm basically a states' rights guy. I'm interested in seeing that the people of Nevada are
protected. Judge Bechtle is from Philadelphia. He doesn't know anything about Nevada law.
Is he the best one to decide how Nevada law should be construed?" Interview with J. Charles
Thompson, supra note 73.
266 We do not suggest that intersystem coordination has caused major complications thus
far. In fact, it appears not to have done so: the cases have given rise to few appeals. Judge
Thompson notes that "I [had] no appeals from any of my orders to the Supreme Court of
Nevada. The lawyers were happy with the process." Interview with J. Charles Thompson,
supra note 73. Similarly, Judge Shortell reports that "[tihere was no question raised [about
authority]." Interview with Brian C. Shortell, supra note 158.
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ing ingenuity and initiative, alerting judges to potential opportunities and
pitfalls, and encouraging them to take risks in the interest of achieving gains.
These stories demonstrate that pursuing state-federal coordination is no
easy task. The participants in the process are doing nothing less than, as
Judge Lambros describes it, creating a new cultural setting for litigation.267
It requires hard work and commitment, imagination and diplomacy, and
persistence tempered by flexibility (and cannot be left to others--early action
by judges is necessary lest opportunities be missed). The potential rewards,
however, are high. State-federal coordination-even if it falls short-can
pay off in furthering economy, efficiency, and fairness in the litigation pro-
cess and in promoting settlements.
What judges have done in these cases replicates the history of the common
law: finding ways around the system's constraints and encumbrances to
achieve equity. And although this paper focuses on large scale litigation,
coordination in small cases may be useful as well. Opportunities for such
coordination and cooperation, once they are recognized, abound. Judges
could coordinate where attorneys claim calendar conflicts. They could clar-
ify the impact of bankruptcy stays, a common source of cross-system irrita-
tion. They could perhaps coordinate to ease the impact of rulings on habeas
corpus petitions. To further these steps, State-Federal Judicial Councils
could adopt protocols that set up procedures for judges to make contact,
communicate, and implement various coordination techniques.2 68 These
councils and individual state and federal judges should give thought to new
areas in which intersystem cooperation may be useful.
Coordination can be promoted if judges are advised of related cases, no
matter how small, pending in the other system. Attorneys will not always
perform this function unless prompted. Pending related cases might, there-
fore, be added to the list of subjects for pretrial conferences by amendment
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16 and state rules of procedure.2 69 Fed-
eral and state rules of procedure might further be amended to specifically
provide authority to judges to coordinate proceedings across state and fed-
eral lines. The adoption of protocols or rules, however, should be informed
by the need for flexibility to adjust to the demands of particular litigation:
the personalities of the participants, the kinds of substantive and procedural
issues involved, and the gains to be achieved weighed against the costs of
267 See supra text accompanying note 139.
268 The Florida State-Federal Judicial Council already has in place a procedure for handling
situations in which attorneys are scheduled to appear in state and federal court at the same
time. See Resolution of the Florida State-Federal Judicial Council Regarding Calendar
Conflicts Between State and Federal Courts (January 26, 1985).
269 The rules could simply authorize state-federal coordination generally or could authorize
an elaborate system of procedures governing intersystem arrangements.
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coordination. They should not stifle ingenuity and initiative. And they
should not obscure the importance of little things on which to build the
requisite collegial relationship between state and federal judges.
State-federal cooperation can give new meaning to judicial federalism,
turning it from a wall into a thoroughfare to better justice. Of walls, Robert
Frost once asked:
Why do they make good neighbors? Isn't it
Where there are cows? But here there are no cows.
Before I built a wall I'd ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out .... 270
270 Robert Frost, Mending Wall, in The Poetry of Robert Frost 33 (Edward C. Lathem ed.,
1969).
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